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WHAT TO DO IF SIMULTANEOUS 
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL 
INABILITY STRUCK TODAY 
Roy E. Brownell II* 
 
Dual incapacity is one of three major inability scenarios involving the Vice 
President that threatens the continuity of the executive branch.  The current 
state of the law in this area, unfortunately, leaves only imperfect options for 
policymakers.  This Article proposes that, in the event of a dual inability, the 
Speaker, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Cabinet should 
meet and then jointly declare that the Speaker is Acting President until either 
the President or Vice President regains capacity.  At the same time, the 
Speaker—as the new Acting President—the President pro tempore, and the 
Cabinet should request that Congress ratify their decision and the process 
they undertook to reach that determination. 
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The legal architecture governing presidential succession and inability 
leaves unaddressed a number of potential hazards that threaten the continuity 
of American governance.1  Vice presidential incapacity is implicated in at 
least three of these scenarios.2  These situations entail (1) when the President 
and Vice President are simultaneously unable to fulfill their duties—what 
will be called “dual incapacity,” (2) when there is a healthy President and an 
incapacitated Vice President, and (3) when a President leaves office abruptly 
 
 1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010); John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability:  Filling in 
the Gaps, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 11, 11; Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on 
Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the 
Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinafter First Clinic Report]. 
 2. In this Article, “incapacity” and “inability” are used interchangeably. 
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and an incapacitated Vice President is slated to succeed him.3  This Article 
will focus on the first of these three perilous situations:  dual incapacity.4  
Groundbreaking work has analyzed what policymakers should do 
prospectively to fix the problem of dual incapacity.5  However, the literature 
has not examined what should be done if dual incapacity were to occur right 
now, before a public solution is put into place.  As such, this Article addresses 
this gap in the literature and suggests necessary steps to be taken moving 
forward.6 
 
 3. See Amar, supra note 1, at 20–23, 27–28; John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession 
and Inability:  Before and After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 935–
39 (2010); First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 13–14, 25–26, 31;. 
 4. This piece is intended to be the first in a series of three articles on how to address 
immediate instances of vice presidential incapacity, each focusing on a different scenario. See 
infra notes 43, 95.  The nation has never experienced dual incapacity of any serious duration, 
though for a few moments in 1986 both President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George 
H.W. Bush were simultaneously unconscious. See Roy E. Brownell II, Vice Presidential 
Inability:  Historical Episodes That Highlight a Significant Constitutional Problem, 46 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 434, 434–35 (2016).  There have also been several occasions when 
dual incapacity could have occurred, including instances involving President James Madison 
and Vice President Elbridge Gerry in 1813, President Abraham Lincoln and Vice President 
Andrew Johnson in 1865, and President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Johnson 
in 1963. See id. at 440–41, 448, 449; see also JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY–FIFTH 
AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 4–5 (3d ed. 2014); GARRETT M. 
GRAFF, RAVEN ROCK:  THE STORY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S SECRET PLAN TO SAVE 
ITSELF—WHILE THE REST OF US DIE 180 n.* (2017). 
 5. See Amar, supra note 1, at 32–35; Feerick, supra note 1, at 19–20; First Clinic Report, 
supra note 1, at 28–35, 61–63; see also Feerick, supra note 3, at 942–43. 
 6. Presumably, with concern over dual incapacity at least partly in mind, the President 
and Vice President seldom travel on the same flight. See Juliet Lapidos, Do Obama and Biden 
Always Fly in Separate Planes?, SLATE (Apr. 13, 2010, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2010/04/do_obama_and_biden_a
lways_fly_in_separate_planes.html [https://perma.cc/LBA4-7PQL].  Prior to the jet age, a 
similar policy discouraged the President and Vice President from riding on the same train. 
Both Roosevelt and Garner out of Country; Hull Is Chief in Unprecedented Situation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1935, at A1 [hereinafter Both Roosevelt and Garner].  In the same vein, the 
two officeholders are rarely overseas simultaneously. See Juliet Eilperin, With Obama and 
Biden Both Overseas, Who’s in Charge?, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/03/19/with-obama-and-biden-
both-overseas-whos-in-charge [https://perma.cc/F37P-ZLGM]; Steve Holland, In Rarity, 
Obama, VP Biden May Be out of U.S. at Same Time Next Week, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:53 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE92D1D720130314 [https://perma.cc/KG7P-
ZKSK]; Donovan Slack, Obama and Biden Abroad at the Same Time?, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 
2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2013/03/obama-and-biden-
abroad-at-the-same-time-159371 [https://perma.cc/8X9H-ZV4S].  The policy of trying to 
ensure that one of the two officeholders remains on U.S. soil has been in place for some time. 
See Terence Smith, For President, Trips Resume at Quick Pace, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1980, at 
B11.  The first time both were out of the country simultaneously was in 1935 when President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President John Nance Garner were in office. See Both 
Roosevelt and Garner, supra, at A1; see also EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:  
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 346 n.49 (4th rev. ed. 1957).  Questions about whether 
both officeholders being abroad at the same time constitutes dual incapacity arose as late as 
the 1940s. See Associated Press, Trips of Roosevelt, Wallace Set Precedent; Experts Deny 
President Gives Up Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1943, at 10.  Following President Kennedy’s 
assassination, newly elevated President Johnson did not travel outside the country until he had 
a Vice President. See GRAFF, supra note 4, at 184. 
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The legal problems surrounding dual incapacity derive from shortcomings 
in the 1947 presidential succession statute.7  The 1947 law addresses dual 
incapacity, but it omits two essential considerations.  The law provides that 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives becomes Acting President if the 
President and Vice President both become incapacitated and, if the Speaker 
is unable or unwilling to become Acting President, the line of succession then 
turns to the President pro tempore (PPT) of the Senate and after him to 
Cabinet officers in the order of their department’s creation.8  However, the 
statute says nothing about (1) how decisions as to dual incapacity are to be 
made or (2) who is to make them.9  Thus, in a situation involving dual 
incapacity, there is no clear indication of who would do what to resolve the 
quandary.  As a result, dual incapacity threatens to paralyze the executive 
branch at its highest levels. 
The task at hand is further complicated by the fact that public knowledge 
is limited regarding what contingency plans are currently in place (if any) to 
address incapacity situations because such steps are confidential.10  This 
Article has unearthed contingency plans that have not previously been made 
public, but it is unclear if they remain in force.  These prior plans reflect that, 
given the failure of the executive branch and Congress to formulate a 
legislative solution, policymakers do not have good options and have been 
 
 7. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 8. See id.  There have long been questions as to the constitutionality of the 1947 statute.  
This doctrinal matter is beyond the scope of this Article and has been ably addressed by others. 
See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of 
Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995); Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar 
and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67 (2010); John F. Manning, Not Proved:  Some 
Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141 
(1995); see generally, e.g., BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS:  A LEGAL GUIDE 
FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 88–94 (2012); RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 131–42 (1951); Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text:  
The Argument for a “New” Interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & 
Disqualification Clause, and the Religious Test Clause—A Response to Professor Josh 
Chafetz’s Impeachment & Assassination, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285, 338 n.81, 341 n.90 (2013).  
There are, however, important practical reasons to believe that the Speaker would in fact 
become Acting President during a dual-incapacity setting. See infra Part V.A. 
 9. See Amar, supra note 1, at 22; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 23; Goldstein, 
supra note 8, at 71.  The statute’s shortcomings in this regard reflect those of the original 
presidential inability provisions under Article II. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (quoting John Dickinson as asking 
“What is the extent of the term ‘disability’ & who is to be the judge of it?”). 
 10. See First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 26–27.  As to whether this Article’s analysis 
is redundant given existing and confidential executive branch plans, the words of the Fordham 
University School of Law’s First Clinic on Presidential Succession are apt:  it is understood 
that others in positions of responsibility have already engaged in contingency 
planning and may find [these] . . . recommendations duplicative . . . .  Nonetheless 
[in the interests of] support[ing] continued planning, as is surely underway, . . .  the 
wisdom of the writers of the Federalist Papers [is to be recalled] that “[a] wise 
nation . . . does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become 
essential to its safety.” 
Id. at 27 (seventh and eighth alterations in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James 
Madison)). 
2017] SOLVING DUAL INABILITY 1031 
forced to improvise.11  The goal of this Article is to identify the least bad 
option under the circumstances. 
Any attempt to provide policymakers with an “off-the-shelf” solution to 
an immediate case of dual incapacity must try to satisfy three desiderata as 
closely as possible:  the proposal must be lawful, politically legitimate,12 and 
practical.  Consistent with these three requirements, this Article offers a 
solution that policymakers should consider if this difficult issue should arise 
(assuming there is not a public solution in place at the time). 
The approach put forward in this Article is that, upon learning of an 
apparent dual incapacity, the Speaker (or officeholder who is next in the line 
of succession)13 should consult with the PPT and the principal officers of the 
executive departments (i.e., the President’s Cabinet).14  The Speaker, PPT, 
and a majority of the Cabinet should then decide whether the President and 
Vice President are, in fact, incapacitated.15 
If the Speaker, PPT, and a majority of the Cabinet decide that dual 
incapacity has indeed occurred, they should instruct executive branch 
lawyers to craft a legal opinion articulating the legal basis upon which they 
have acted.  Following the opinion’s completion, the Speaker, PPT, and 
Cabinet should make the dual incapacity determination and legal opinion 
public and announce that the Speaker will be assuming the role of Acting 
President until the incapacity of the President or Vice President has been 
lifted. 
In this joint public statement, the Speaker-turned-Acting President, PPT, 
and Cabinet would announce that what has been done was consistent with the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.  But, out of an abundance of caution, 
the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet would state further that they are requesting 
 
 11. See A Modern Father of Our Constitution:  An Interview with Former Senator Birch 
Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 807 (2010) [hereinafter Interview with Sen. Bayh] (addressing 
solutions to dual incapacity under current law); id. (statement of John D. Feerick) (“That’s a 
tough problem.  I don’t know how that would play out.  There are just a lot of possibilities.”); 
cf. Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1040 (2010). 
 12. See Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, 
Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Recommendations for Improving the 
Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 934–36, 948–50, 955–56, 971–74, 
977–80, 986, 988, 1006 (2017) [hereinafter Second Clinic Report]; cf. Herbert Brownell, Jr., 
Presidential Disability:  The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 200 
(1958). 
 13. To avoid redundancy, unless otherwise stated, the term “the Speaker” will refer to the 
Speaker or the next in line of succession if the Speaker cannot, or will not, serve. 
 14. Cf. Interview with Sen. Bayh, supra note 11, at 807.  Senator Bayh stated, regarding a 
dual-incapacity scenario, “If I were Speaker, I’d sure try to see if I could get the Cabinet to 
support me.” Id.  John Feerick stated that the Speaker is not legally “bound by what the Cabinet 
says” in a dual-incapacity scenario, although “the Speaker would probably want to get some 
support from the Congress, I would think, as a practical matter . . . .” Id.; see also Feerick, 
supra note 3, at 939. 
 15. As a practical matter, the majority of the Cabinet would almost have to include the 
Secretary of State or next eligible executive branch successor and the Attorney General (given 
the legal concerns involved). See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing possible 
constraints upon the Secretary challenging the legality of the Speaker’s elevation); infra Part 
V.A. 
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that Congress retroactively ratify the process followed by the group in 
making their decision.16  The Acting President would then submit 
recommended legislative language that would propose a statutory process for 
how the President and Vice President could demonstrate that they have 
regained their capacity and that would include a clear dual incapacity 
determination procedure going forward.  This recommended bill language 
would closely track Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.17 
During the same ceremony, the Speaker would announce his resignation 
from Congress.  The Speaker would additionally state that, if the President 
or Vice President at any point believe they have regained their capacity prior 
to the recommended bill’s enactment, either officeholder could make a public 
declaration to that effect.  If the Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet do not 
contest the matter, the formerly incapacitated officeholder (or officeholders) 
would then regain their positions.18  If the Speaker, PPT, and a majority of 
the Cabinet disagree with the declaration,19 Congress would decide the 
matter with legislative inaction resulting in the return of the President and 
Vice President to office.20 
This Article begins by discussing two structural constitutional norms: (1) 
that executive power cannot be permitted to lapse and (2) that any solution 
to dual incapacity should be consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
Next is a brief overview of the legal considerations involved with dual 
incapacity.  The Article then discusses possible options to address the 
problem, including (1) the use of letter arrangements and contingency plans 
in general, (2) the application of the contingent grant-of-power theory 
(CGOPT), (3) the contingency plans adopted during the Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton administrations, (4) the adoption of a statute before the Speaker 
assumes the position of Acting President,21 and (5) the initiation of 
impeachment proceedings.22  The shortcomings of each of these options 
 
 16. Whether Congress would expressly sanction all of the Acting President’s governing 
actions in the interim would be a matter to be worked out by the Acting President and 
Congress. 
 17. Cf. Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 960–62. 
 18. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 19. An appeal of the incapacity determination could be undertaken by the President, the 
Vice President, or both together.  If the Vice President alone were to successfully demonstrate 
his capacity, he would bump the former Speaker from the White House and become Acting 
President. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(c)(2) (2012). 
 20. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.  If the President and Vice President are 
simultaneously incapacitated but the President attempts to resume office before the Vice 
President, it is all the more important that the process for his recovery of office follow as 
closely as possible the provisions of Section 4 as such a situation would be very similar to a 
Section 4 scenario.   
 21. In this regard, the bill would need to be enacted without the incapacitated President’s 
signature. Id. art. I, § 7.  This occurred twenty-eight times during President Woodrow Wilson’s 
illness. See FEERICK, supra note 4, at 16. 
 22. Yet another alternative to handling dual incapacity could be to view the incapacitated 
President and Vice President as having vacated their positions.  The Speaker would then 
become Acting President.  This approach is highly dubious, however, particularly on 
constitutional and legitimacy fronts.  First, the word “vacant” clearly denotes that no one is in 
office. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 409 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The word ‘vacant’ means ‘not filled or occupied . . . .’” (quoting Vacant, 
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require that another approach must be found.  A discussion of this Article’s 
recommended solution to dual incapacity follows.  The Article then closes 
with analyses of potential counterarguments. 
I.  TWO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS:  THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT 
EXECUTIVE POWER NEVER LAPSES AND THE EXISTENCE OF PROCEDURAL 
GUIDELINES FOR REMOVING A PRESIDENT FOR INCAPACITY 
There are two structural constitutional norms that are vital to 
understanding how best to address an immediate situation involving dual 
incapacity.  The first is the structural principle that both continuity and 
stability of all three branches of government must be preserved.23  The 
second is that there are procedural guidelines established by the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment that should observed in order to remove a President for 
incapacity.24 
With respect to the overriding need for continuity of the executive branch, 
the constitutional norm is reflected in several constitutional provisions.  
Article II states that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States.”25  The word “shall” conveys that it is mandatory that 
executive power remain in place.26  Article II also provides that the President 
“shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years,”27 again conveying the 
expectation that a President must be in office continuously until the end of 
his term and another President takes over.  Section I, Clause 6 of Article II,28 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,29 the Recess Appointments Clause,30 and 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twentieth Amendment further underscore the 
 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2527 (1976)).  But, with an incapacitated 
President and Vice President, the two are still in office; they simply are suffering from an 
incapacity.  Second, whatever process that is created to declare the office vacant would have 
the effect of removing the President and Vice President from office.  However, there is only 
one means under the Constitution to permanently remove either officeholder, and that is 
through the impeachment process. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 69, 81, 91 (1961).  Third, the vacancy argument was clearly repudiated during 
consideration of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Presidential Inability:  Hearings on H.R. 
836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 87 (1965) (statements of Rep. 
Richard Poff and Sen. Birch Bayh); id. at 246 (statements of Rep. Richard Poff and Herbert 
Brownell, former Att’y Gen.); see also FEERICK, supra note 4, at 109, 365.  As a result, this 
constitutional norm would counsel against declaring the offices vacant.  Finally, the vacancy 
determination process would presumably result in ending the incapacitated President’s and 
Vice President’s salary and benefits since they would no longer be in office.  This might invite 
litigation as the President and Vice President, and their families, would be suffering from a 
tangible harm through the deprivation of compensation and health-care benefits (both of which 
might be seriously needed if either of the incapacities was health related).  For these reasons, 
the vacancy option is highly problematic and does not merit extended discussion. 
 23. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 936, 967–68. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 25. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 26. See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presidency, 
16 PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 390–91 (2013) (discussing the mandatory nature of the word “shall”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  
 29. Id. amend. XXV.  
 30. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see also Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 967. 
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principle of an enduring executive.31  Indeed, the very existence of the vice 
presidency manifests this constitutional precept.32 
Moreover, as noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution “is not a 
suicide pact.”33  It was designed to function, not to flounder, amidst sterile 
abstractions.34  The nation needs a President at the head of the executive 
branch at all times in order to ensure that the government continues to 
operate.  To this end, a fundamental constitutional norm has been recognized 
that executive power should never lapse.35  Under the Constitution, however, 
executive power is uniquely vulnerable to disruption since the executive is 
the only one of the three branches in which leadership is manifested in a 
single person.36 
In this regard, there are certain presidential duties that are nondelegable.37  
Without a President, there is no Commander in Chief of the military,38 no 
direction to American diplomacy, no one to veto improvident legislation,39 
no one to issue pardons,40 and no one to nominate judges or senior executive 
branch officials.41  The broad structural consideration that executive power 
may not be permitted to lapse dictates that relevant constitutional and 
statutory law must be read broadly and pragmatically to ensure that the 
operations of the executive branch can continue so that these nondelegable, 
presidential duties may be carried out. 
 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 3–4.  For more on the Twentieth Amendment, see 
generally Brian C. Kalt, Of Death and Deadlocks:  Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment, 54 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 101 (2017).  Given that the disputed election of 1800 threatened an 
interregnum of executive power, the Twelfth Amendment could arguably also be added to this 
list of constitutional provisions.  
 32. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 967–68. 
 33. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); see also Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 34. See, e.g., JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 185 (2007) 
(quoting Alexander Hamilton’s statement that “the Constitution must be construed so as to 
make its own survival possible” (footnote omitted)); JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 32 (rev. ed. 1964) (“Self-preservation is the first law of national 
life and the Constitution itself provides the necessary powers in order to defend and preserve 
the United States.’” (quoting Charles E. Hughes, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice, War 
Powers Under the Constitution, Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept. 1917), 
in S. Doc. No. 65-105, at 3 (1917))). 
 35. See President’s Power to Fill Vacancies in Recess of the Senate, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 
32, 38 (1866); Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673, 675–76 (1841); 4 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 135–36 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 3d ed. 1937) (statement of Archibald Maclaine at 
the North Carolina Convention); Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 936, 967–68. 
 36. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 500 (1866) (stating that “the President is the 
executive department”); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 713 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“[I]nterference with a President’s ability to carry out his public responsibilities is 
constitutionally equivalent to interference with the ability of the entirety of Congress, or the 
Judicial Branch, to carry out its public obligations.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Presidential Succession & Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 
93–99 (1981); Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 84 (1961). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 39. Id. art. II, § 7. 
 40. Id. art. II, § 2. 
 41. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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The second structural principle stems from Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Section 4 provides: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties 
of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if 
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.42 
In essence, Section 4 provides a procedural floor when it comes to 
removing the President for incapacity.  There are three key elements to this 
procedural norm:  (1) participation by the successor in the inability 
determination, (2) participation by the Cabinet in the process, and (3) an 
opportunity for the President to appeal the decision.  Any means of resolving 
dual incapacity, which includes determining presidential inability, should 
comply with this constitutional norm. 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Unlike the other two vice presidential incapacity scenarios—a healthy 
President and an incapacitated Vice President,43 and a President leaving 
 
 42. Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 43. As will be discussed in a later article, when addressing an immediate case of sole vice 
presidential inability, Congress could likely take action under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause by asserting authority to prevent future episodes of dual 
incapacity. See Feerick, supra note 3, at 942–43; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 962–
64.  An 1853 statute authorizing the administration of the oath of office to the deathly ill Vice 
President-Elect William King while he was in Cuba could arguably be seen as an example of 
Congress acting to prevent vice presidential inability. See Act of March 2, 1853, ch. 93, 10 
Stat. 180; CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 2d Sess. 787 (1853); Henry Barrett Learned, The Vice-
President’s Oath of Office, NATION, Mar. 1, 1917, at 248–50.  Until the early twentieth 
century, in many circles, it was thought that if a President or Vice President were overseas 
then he was in fact incapacitated. See CORWIN, supra note 6, at 55, 346–47; GRAFF, supra note 
4, at 164–65.  In addressing vice presidential inability, judicial disability statutes might also 
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office with an incapacitated Vice President waiting in the wings—dual 
incapacity benefits from applicable constitutional provisions.  Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 6, which will be called the Dual Inability Clause, authorizes 
Congress to take action in the area of joint presidential and vice presidential 
incapacity.  It states that “Congress may by Law provide for the Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President . . . .”44 
In addition, the Necessary and Proper Clause reinforces the provisions of 
the Dual Inability Clause.  It authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”45  In essence, 
this Clause allows Congress to act to ensure the execution of other powers of 
the federal government. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause has been construed broadly in historic 
rulings such as McCulloch v. Maryland.46  Its broad mandate to “carry[] into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution” gives Congress authority to prevent a lapse in “executive 
power” because such authority is among the “other Powers vested by this 
 
provide useful analogous support. See 28 U.S.C § 3 (2012); 28 U.S.C § 372(b) (2012); see 
also Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 969.  Incapacity involving vice presidents and 
incapacity involving judges share a common concern:  the Constitution is silent on removal 
options other than the impeachment process.  The author’s view that Congress might be able 
to legislate to prevent future episodes of dual incapacity has benefitted from conversations 
with Professors John Feerick, John Rogan, and Joel Goldstein. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).  It could be argued that the Dual 
Inability Clause only authorizes the creation of a line of succession and nothing more. See 
Feerick, supra note 3, at 943.  Given the overriding structural imperative of ensuring executive 
branch continuity and the fact that the succession acts have addressed matters beyond merely 
creating a line of succession, see Feerick, supra note 1, at 20, this would seem to be an overly 
cramped interpretation of the provision, see John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, 
Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 995 (2004); 
Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 968.  In this regard, the expression “provide for the 
case” would seem to include sufficient latitude for determining who decides dual incapacity, 
and how.  Even if the Dual Inability Clause only provides authority for the creation of the line 
of succession, the Necessary and Proper Clause doubtlessly would supply Congress with the 
power to determine the means of effectuating the former clause. See, e.g., McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are 
Constitutional.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003) (“No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end 
is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every 
particular power necessary for doing it is included.”); see also 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445, 445–95 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (1791); Feerick, supra 
note 3, at 942–43; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 962–64, 968. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  For more on the potential use of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to address inability, see FEERICK, supra note 4, at 246; Feerick, supra note 1, at 
20; Feerick, supra note 3, at 942–43; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
 46. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  For further discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause in a 
dual incapacity setting, see Feerick, supra note 1, at 20; Feerick, supra note 3, at 942; First 
Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 29; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 962–64. 
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Constitution.”47  That is to say, use of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
this context would be effectuating the overall purposes of Article II as well 
as, more specifically, the Executive Power and Dual Inability Clauses. 
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was enacted under authority of 
the Dual Inability Clause and was likely reinforced by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.48  It states that 
[i]f, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or 
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and 
as Representative in Congress, act as President.49 
As will be recalled, it provides no statutory explanation as to who decides 
that the two officeholders are incapacitated, nor does it provide a mechanism 
for such determination. 
III.  ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO RESOLVING AN IMMEDIATE 
OCCURRENCE OF DUAL INCAPACITY 
Before this Article turns to its recommended approach for addressing an 
immediate occurrence of dual incapacity, it will first analyze alternate 
solutions.  These include (1) letter arrangements and contingency plans in 
general, (2) the CGOPT, (3) the Reagan-Bush-Clinton contingency plans, (4) 
ex ante legislation, and (5) impeachment.  Each of these proposed solutions 
is reviewed to gauge its practicality, legality, and legitimacy.  This Part 
concludes that each alternative has disqualifying flaws. 
A.  Letter Arrangements and Contingency Plans in General 
1.  Practicality 
One potential means of effectuating various approaches to dual incapacity 
is reliance on a preexisting secret letter arrangement or contingency plan.50  
 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413–14. 
 48. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-17, at 2, 4 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 7766–67 (1947) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch); id. at 7694–96 (statement of Sen. Wherry); id. at 8634 (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 49. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2012). 
 50. The focus of this Article is on unanticipated dual incapacity—akin to a situation 
involving Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  An anticipated dual incapacity 
situation—similar to a situation involving Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (e.g., the 
Vice President is in a coma and the President has to have a routine surgical procedure)—could 
likely be addressed through a public letter arrangement between the President and the Speaker 
whereby the former temporarily delegates authority to the latter.  This letter arrangement or 
contingency plan could articulate that it is promulgated under authority of the 1947 
Presidential Succession Act and that it is consistent with the spirit of Section 3 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.  From a constitutional standpoint, such a letter agreement might fare better 
than a secret letter agreement involving unanticipated dual incapacity.  For example, assume 
the letter arrangement for unanticipated dual incapacity follows the CGOPT.  As noted below, 
one of the major legal and legitimacy drawbacks to this approach is that the Speaker would be 
in the position of acting alone to determine the President’s inability.  This is contrary to the 
constitutional norms established by Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which provide 
that the next in line of succession should gain the approval of a majority of the Cabinet before 
1038 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
That assumes, of course, that such a plan is in place.  One may not be.  Since 
adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the executive branch has never 
publicly disclosed the existence of a dual-incapacity agreement.51  While a 
secret letter arrangement or contingency plan is essentially a vehicle through 
which to implement a specific inability determination process, the approach 
deserves to be evaluated on its own since its very existence over time could 
come to be seen as a constitutional process through past practice.  This is 
problematic as the mechanism itself carries with it some inherent flaws. 
If a secret letter arrangement or contingency plan does, in fact, currently 
exist, its implementation would arguably meet the practicality test.  All that 
would need to be done would be for the designated person or persons to take 
whatever action is laid out in the letter and then cite (and better yet, publicly 
produce) the arrangement, and the inability issue would be “fixed” from a 
practical standpoint.  Given the premium rightly placed on providing the 
executive branch with continuous leadership,52 that is certainly a mark in 
favor of this alternative. 
Assuming a secret letter arrangement or contingency plan is currently in 
place, the obvious question is “What does it say?”  More precisely, what does 
the letter or plan purport to authorize, and based on what legal authority?  
Clearly, the constitutionality of a letter arrangement or contingency plan 
depends in large part on what is called for in the text of the letter.  If, for 
example, the letter arrangement or contingency plan follows the CGOPT,53 
as argued in Part III.B, it may face serious constitutional or legitimacy 
difficulties.  If it follows Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,54 it is 
more likely to pass constitutional muster.  Either way, however, the general 
contours of letter arrangements or contingency plans should be made 
public.55  This is important from both a constitutional and a legitimacy 
standpoint. 
 
a determination can be reached and, if the President contests the question, the matter should 
go to Congress for resolution.  In an anticipated dual incapacity setting, however, the President 
would make the determination of his own inability in advance, which is fully in keeping with 
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Legitimacy concerns would also seem to be 
reduced in an anticipated setting rather than in an unanticipated context since (1) if precedent 
from Section 3 is followed, the President would publicly reveal the arrangement himself (as 
opposed to the Speaker unveiling a secret letter after announcing his own elevation) and (2) 
the inability is typically for a short duration wherein the Speaker would be unlikely to make 
significant executive branch decisions.  Even if the inability became a long-term one, the 
Speaker would still be acting consistent with the norms of Section 3 and with the President’s 
prior public approval.  That said, a statutory authorization prior to the inability would 
obviously be preferable. 
 51. In his memoirs, Dick Cheney disclosed that, as Vice President, he executed a 
presigned resignation letter.  The document, however, did not address dual incapacity. See 
DICK CHENEY WITH LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME:  A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 319–22 
(2011). 
 52. See generally supra Part I. 
 53. See Feerick, supra note 3, at 939; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 54. See infra Part III.C. 
 55. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 934–35.  This is not a universally held 
view. See Interview with Sen. Bayh, supra note 11, at 813 (expressing skepticism about the 
need for letter arrangements regarding presidential incapacity to be made public). 
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2.  Legality 
a.  Pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment Letter Agreements 
On the constitutional front, letter agreements—at least the way they have 
been traditionally crafted—have not been thought to be legally binding.56  
Prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Presidents and Vice Presidents 
executed letter agreements in case the chief executive became incapacitated.  
President Dwight Eisenhower was the first to adopt such an approach when 
he signed a letter agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon in 1958.57 
Nixon, however, viewed his letter agreement with Eisenhower as being 
morally but not legally binding on the parties.  The Vice President later wrote 
that the “letter established historical precedent” but reflected “mere 
expressions of a President’s desires, [and did] not have the force of law.”58  
Letters, he contended, “are only as good as the will of the parties to keep 
them.”59 
Other authorities have agreed.60  Speaker of the House John McCormack, 
who had a comparable agreement with President Lyndon Johnson following 
 
 56. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 4, at 54. 
 57. See First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 77–79.  The first executive branch contingency 
plan arguably was put in place following the death of President James Garfield and the 
elevation of Vice President Chester Arthur in 1881. See John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment:  Its Origins and History, in MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
THE 25TH AMENDMENT 1, 7 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000); David A. Erhart, Note, “I Am in 
Control Here”:  Constitutional and Practical Questions Regarding Presidential Succession, 
51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 323, 330–31 (2013).  Under the succession law at the time, the PPT 
and the Speaker were the only successors.  Congress, however, was out of session and had yet 
to fill either position, and Arthur, as the newly minted President, had to travel from New York 
to Washington.  Ahead of his departure, Arthur mailed a confidential letter which would have 
called the Senate into session to elect a PPT if anything had happened to him on his way to 
the capital.  He arrived safely and, in the usual manner, then proceeded to issue the 
proclamation for Congress to convene. See Giving Voice to Sorrow:  Words of Respect and 
Affection for Mr. Arthur, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1886), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9A04E0D7123FE533A25752C2A9679D94679FD7CF 
[https://perma.cc/5QCY-EBG5]; see also GEORGE FREDERICK HOWE, CHESTER A. ARTHUR, A 
QUARTER-CENTURY OF MACHINE POLITICS 154–55 (1957); Feerick, supra, at 7. 
 58. RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 179–80 (1962).  Eisenhower and Attorney General 
William Rogers believed that the agreement was not contrary to law but also conceded that 
the arrangement rested on the “mutual[] trust[]” that existed between the President and the 
Vice President. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS:  WAGING PEACE, 1956–
1961, at 234–35 (1965). 
 59. NIXON, supra note 58, at 179. 
 60. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. H7937 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1965) (statement of Rep. Celler); 
111 CONG. REC. H3285 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1965) (statement of Sen. Hruska); Presidential 
Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearing on S.J. Res 1 et al. Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 32 
(1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); GRAFF, supra 
note 4, at 183; Feerick, supra note 3, at 922; Michael Nelson, Background Paper, in A 
HEARTBEAT AWAY:  REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE 
PRESIDENCY 79, 87 (1988); Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, White House Assoc. 
Counsel, to the President Regarding the 25th Amendment (Aug. 21, 1975), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amend
ment_executive_materials [https://perma.cc/M6EU-GJXB]; see also FEERICK, supra note 4, 
at 343. 
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President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, was of like mind.  He was quoted 
as saying that their “written agreement . . . [was] outside the law” and 
constituted “an agreement between individuals.”61  McCormack’s 
predecessor as Speaker, Sam Rayburn, went even further.  He contended that 
the 1958 letter arrangement between Eisenhower and Nixon not only failed 
to bind the parties but was unconstitutional.62  If a letter arrangement is not 
legally binding, that calls into question the lawfulness of all subsequent 
actions undertaken by the Acting President and could invite litigation.63 
These pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment letters did not speak to dual 
incapacity, however.  They only addressed situations involving an 
incapacitated President.  While the content of letter arrangements or 
contingency plans largely determines whether they are constitutional and 
legally binding, some authorities seem to question the viability of any type 
of letter agreement after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.64 
A letter arrangement that explicitly stated it was implementing the 
provisions of the Dual Inability and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the 
1947 Presidential Succession Act, could be defensible.  Were this to be done, 
the letter arrangement could be seen as being akin to an agency issuing 
regulations to implement a statute (even if the statute makes no explicit 
provision for rulemaking).65  This broad statutory construction would seem 
warranted given the constitutional premium placed on ensuring executive 
continuity. 
It could also be argued that a letter arrangement or a contingency plan 
involving dual incapacity, if prepared and made ready for use by multiple 
administrations, might acquire a constitutional status over time.66  Certainly, 
in the realm of separation of powers, there have been a number of practices 
that were begun well after the formative years of the Constitution that later 
 
 61. FEERICK, supra note 4, at 100 (quoting Speaker McCormack).   
 62. See Edwin L. Dale, Jr., Eisenhower Disability Pact Calls for ‘Acting President’:  
Terms of the Agreement Made Public—Nixon Would Take Over Duties Until President Had 
Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1958, at 1, 17; see also Stephen W. Stathis, Presidential 
Disability Agreements Prior to the 25th Amendment, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 208, 210 
(1982). 
 63. See Nelson, supra note 60, at 87. 
 64. See MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 10 (1988); cf. Presidential Succession & 
Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 98 n.7 (1981); William F. Brown & 
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession:  “The Emperor Has No 
Clones,” 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1405 n.61 (1987); Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability 
and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 479 (2009). 
 65. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 408 (5th ed. 
2010); A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFF. FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9BM-2LCD]. 
 66. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 94 (1961); Goldstein, supra note 8, 
at 71–72; Bruce Ackerman, Take Your Paws off the Presidency!, SLATE (July 15, 2008, 3:35 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/07/take_your_ 
paws_off_the_presidency.html [https://perma.cc/4X8D-PVX5].  The author has benefited 
greatly from conversations with Professor Joel Goldstein on this subject. 
2017] SOLVING DUAL INABILITY 1041 
came to be acknowledged as constitutional doctrine.67  However, if they 
currently exist, the secret nature of these contingency arrangements 
complicates this argument. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer,68 famously observed that 
[i]t is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life 
has written upon them.  In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, 
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure 
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested 
in the President by § 1 of Art. II.69 
This formulation, which has been used as a guide for determining the 
constitutionality of longstanding political custom,70 would seem not to apply 
to a secret dual incapacity letter arrangement or contingency plan.  First, it 
seems highly unlikely that such a procedure would be seen as having been 
“pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned.”71  
If such an agreement exists, it is confidential.72  Perhaps some in Congress 
have been briefed on these plans (e.g., the Speaker and PPT) but certainly not 
Congress as a whole or, by extension, the public.73  The fact that the existence 
and content of pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment letters were made public would 
seem to inform how the “pursued to the knowledge of Congress” formulation 
should be interpreted in the context of presidential inability.74  How could 
 
 67. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2559 (2014); Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989); Merriam v. Clinch, 17 F. Cas. 68, 70 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 
9460); see also Roy E. Brownell II, Don Wallace, Jr.:  Burkean Presidentialist, in A 
REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR. 
607, 615 n.64 (Borzu Sabahi et al. eds., 2014); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in 
Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 115 (1984); Joel K. Goldstein, 
History and Constitutional Interpretation:  Some Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. 
L. REV. 647, 656 (2016). 
 68. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 69. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 70. See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559–60; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 686 (1981). 
 71. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11. 
 72. See First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 73. Vice President Dick Cheney, for instance, only informed his legal counsel and the 
President of his presigned resignation letter. See CHENEY WITH CHENEY, supra note 51, at 321–
22.  For more on the secret nature of contingency plans, see GRAFF, supra note 4, at 317, 371–
72, 375–76, 384–86; William M. Arkin & Robert Windrem, Secrets of 9/11:  New Details of 
Chaos, Nukes Emerge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016, 10:53 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/9-11-anniversary/secrets-9-11-new-details-chaos-nukes-emerge-n645711 
[https://perma.cc/T64C-4864].  See generally HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL 
CONTINUITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2007), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1384886826028-729844d3fd23ff85d94d52186c85748f/NCPIP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33BQ-8HA5]; Ackerman, supra note 66. 
 74. See, e.g., Stathis, supra note 62, at 210–12, 214; Dale, supra note 62, at 1, 17; 
Disability Text, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1966, at 26; Johnson Provides for a Disability:  Agrees 
with McCormack on Temporary Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1963, at A1; Joseph A. 
Loftus, Kennedy Provides That Johnson Will Act If He Is Incapacitated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
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Congress sanction or “never before question[]” something of which it has no 
knowledge (or, at least, very little)?75 
The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the importance of notice in 
political-branch disputes over the constitutionality of executive branch 
practice.  For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,76 the Court reasoned 
that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued 
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption 
that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.’”77  Given the 
judiciary’s reasoning in this decision and others,78 a key plank in Justice 
Frankfurter’s formulation in Youngstown—congressional knowledge—
would seem inapplicable in the case of secret dual-incapacity letter 
arrangements or contingency plans.  Since the congressional notice 
requirement is not satisfied, the case that a letter or contingency plan would 
achieve the status of a constitutional gloss on executive power due solely to 
past practice is certainly made more difficult. 
The argument in favor of past practice is further complicated by the fact 
that the authority for addressing dual incapacity has been clearly assigned to 
Congress by the Constitution.79  Practice cannot change constitutional text, 
as Justice Frankfurter himself said in the very same opinion.80  It is especially 
difficult to see how Congress could “lose,” or even come to share, its 
authority in the dual incapacity realm through an executive branch practice if 
the legislative branch were unaware, or almost wholly unaware, of that 
practice.81 
Second, it is uncertain whether letter arrangements or contingency plans 
actually do constitute a “systematic, unbroken executive practice.”82  The 
initial burst of letter arrangements under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
 
1961, at A1; Charles Mohr, Johnson Reaches Disability Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1965, at 
3; Text of the Kennedy-Johnson Accord on Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 19. 
 75. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 67, at 135–37. 
 76. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 77. Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 474 
(1915)). 
 78. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 299 (1981) (“This history of administrative 
construction was repeatedly communicated to Congress, not only by routine promulgation of 
Executive Orders and regulations, but also by specific presentations . . . .”); Midwest Oil, 236 
U.S. at 481 (“Congress, with notice of this practice and of this claim of [executive branch] 
authority, received the report.  Neither at that session nor afterwards did it ever repudiate the 
action taken or the power claimed.  Its silence was acquiescence.  Its acquiescence was 
equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the power was revoked by some subsequent 
action by Congress.”); see also Glennon, supra note 67, at 135–37. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (“Deeply imbedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant 
the Constitution”); RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 98 
(1974); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969); Inland Waterways 
Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940). 
 81. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 67, at 135–37.  The breadth and scope of past 
congressional action in presidential succession acts further reaffirms congressional authority 
in this area and the willingness of Congress to exercise such power when it wishes. See 
Feerick, supra note 3, at 943. 
 82. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11. 
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and Johnson did not address dual incapacity.  Moreover, the practice of public 
letter arrangements ended abruptly with adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  Therefore, these precedents would not seem to qualify as being 
part of longstanding practice regarding dual-incapacity plans.  While it is not 
entirely clear when confidential arrangements about succession and inability 
began to be crafted after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or to what extent they 
involve (or involved) dual incapacity,83 it appears that the Reagan 
administration was the first to implement such plans.84 
b.  Post-Twenty-Fifth Amendment Agreements 
and Contingency Plans 
Though President Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humphrey entered 
into an agreement of some sort prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,85 they 
do not seem to have done so following adoption of the Amendment.86  Vice 
President Spiro Agnew revealed that he and President Richard Nixon never 
established an incapacity plan and never spoke about the matter.87  Nor does 
it seem that Nixon established a contingency plan with Speaker of the House 
Carl Albert when the latter was next in line to the presidency after Agnew’s 
departure.88  Apparently, Nixon reached a verbal understanding with Vice 
President Ford.89 
Members of the Ford White House staff advocated that the President enter 
into a letter arrangement with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to effectuate 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.90  The draft arrangement was never executed, 
however.91  Moreover, it did not entail dual incapacity.92  During the Carter 
 
 83. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, supra note 60, at 4 (writing in 1975 
that “[s]ince the ratification of the 25th Amendment, there is no record of written agreements 
between a President and a Vice President”); see also FEERICK, supra note 4, at 344.  
 84. See infra note 95. 
 85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also FEERICK, supra note 4, at 359 n.17. 
 86. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, supra note 60, at 2; see also FEERICK, 
supra note 4, at 342. 
 87. See Presidential Succession & Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. O.L.C. 91, 103 
(1981); see also FEERICK, supra note 4, at 344; Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, 
supra note 60, at 4. 
 88. Albert had Ted Sorenson draft a “comprehensive contingency plan” for him in case 
the Speaker needed to become Acting President. See Memorandum from Theodore C. 
Sorensen to the Speaker of the House (Nov. 8, 1973) (on file with the University of Oklahoma, 
Carl Albert Center, Congressional and Political Collections, Carl Albert Collection, 
Legislative, Box 191, Folder 25); see also Ted Gup, Speaker Albert Was Ready to Be 
President, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ 
politics/1982/11/28/speaker-albert-was-ready-to-be-president/84ebaa61-9cf1-4817-836e-
a993e7e0e980/ [https://perma.cc/V9CR-PE8R].  One suspects that Albert would not have 
gone to this trouble if Nixon and he already had an arrangement in place. 
 89. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, supra note 60, at 4; see also FEERICK, 
supra note 4, at 344. 
 90. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, supra note 60, at 4, 6–9; see also 
FEERICK, supra note 4, at 344, 346–49. 
 91. Memorandum from Frank Wiggins to Mike Berman, Counsel to Vice President Walter 
Mondale [hereinafter Wiggins Memorandum] (on file with the George H.W. Bush Presidential 
Library Center, C. Boyden Gray Files, OA/ID No. CF01823, Folder ID No. 1823-005). 
 92. See id. at 1. 
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administration, White House staff again tried to execute a letter arrangement 
between the President and Vice President; they do not seem to have 
succeeded either.93  President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George 
H.W. Bush entered into a verbal agreement about how to implement the terms 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.94  These efforts, however, did not entail 
dual incapacity. 
In 1982, the White House Counsel’s Office under President Reagan 
compiled a binder addressing a host of presidential succession and inability 
scenarios.95  One of the contingency plans involved dual incapacity.  The 
Reagan administration proposed to resolve the matter by “implement[ing] 
procedures which parallel the 25th Amendment.”96  In this regard, “[t]he 
determination . . . should be made by the Speaker of the House and the 
Cabinet.  They should then transmit their written declaration of inability to 
the” PPT and House majority and minority leaders.97  This effort appears to 
have been continued under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.98  
Fred Fielding, who served as the White House Counsel under President 
Reagan, indicated that the binder he had worked on in the early 1980s was 
 
 93. See Email from Jimmy Carter Presidential Library to author (Oct. 3, 2017) (on file 
with author); Memorandum from Robert Torricelli, Assoc. Counsel to the Vice President, to 
Mike Berman, Counsel to the Vice President 4–5 (Mar. 21, 1978) [hereinafter Torricelli 
Memorandum] (on file with the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library Center, C. Boyden 
Gray Files, OA/ID No.CF01823, Folder ID No. 1823-005); Wiggins Memorandum, supra 
note 91, at 1; see also FEERICK, supra note 4, at 224 (quoting Jimmy Carter as saying that 
while he was President there “was no ordinary way to ascertain whether or not [he] was 
incapacitated, or when the transfer of authority would be made”). 
 94. See Memorandum from Dianna G. Holland, Admin. Assistant, Office of White House 
Counsel, to the file (July 11, 1986) (on file with author) (“[T]he reference to a long-standing 
arrangement between the President and Vice President [in Reagan’s July 13, 1985 letter to 
Congress] is not an agreement that was ever put in writing; . . . the President and the Vice 
President reaffirmed a discussion that they had after the assassination attempt with regard to 
the transfer of power.  This reaffirmation was done in [White House Counsel] Mr. Fielding’s 
presence shortly before the July 13 event.”). 
 95. See generally Office of Counsel to the President, Contingency Plans—Death or 
Disability of the President (June 1, 1982) [hereinafter Reagan Contingency Plans] (on file with 
George H.W. Bush Presidential Library Center, C. Boyden Gray Files, OA/ID No. CF01823, 
Folder ID No. 1823-005).  The attempt on Reagan’s life may have prompted this undertaking. 
See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 933.  The Reagan-Bush-Clinton contingency plans 
did not address how to handle a situation involving the Vice President alone becoming 
incapacitated, though the plans did discuss what to do regarding an incapacitated Vice 
President potentially becoming President (i.e., suggesting that, unless the Vice President can 
take the oath of office, he cannot become President). Reagan Contingency Plans, supra, tab 
G, at 2; Office of Counsel to the President, Contingency Plans—Death or Disability of the 
President tab G (Mar. 16, 1993) [hereinafter Clinton Contingency Plans] (on file with William 
J. Clinton Presidential Library, Bruce Lindsey Files, OA/ID No. 20652).  The author plans to 
discuss these matters in a future article. See supra notes 4, 43. 
 96. Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2–3; see also Clinton Contingency 
Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2. 
 97. Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2–3; see also Clinton Contingency 
Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2. 
 98. Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95.  The 1982 Reagan contingency plan is 
found in the Bush presidential archives in the papers of Bush’s White House Counsel.  The 
fact that the Reagan plans—and accompanying materials—appear in the Bush Counsel’s file 
and that they seem to be identical to those found in the Clinton archives would indicate that 
the Bush administration simply adopted Reagan’s plans as well.   
2017] SOLVING DUAL INABILITY 1045 
still there when he returned to the Counsel’s office twenty years later to work 
for President George W. Bush.99  It is unclear whether the George W. Bush 
administration modified the plans. 
There has been some public reporting about contingency plans being in 
place during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.100  If 
true, and if those plans are similar to the Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans, and if 
they continue during the Trump administration, that would certainly 
demonstrate the existence of past practice.101  Thus, such contingency plans 
may satisfy Justice Frankfurter’s criterion that historic practice must be 
“systematic [and] unbroken,” even if the other requirement—that they be 
public—has not been. 
In sum, the viability of any current letter agreement or contingency plan 
governing dual incapacity is hard to assess since, if it exists, it is secret.  Past 
arrangements that have been made public have not been thought to be legally 
binding.  And, if a letter arrangement or contingency plan that addresses dual 
incapacity is in place—assuming it otherwise purports to create legal 
obligations—the secrecy surrounding the plan complicates the constitutional 
calculus and, as will be seen, casts doubt on its political legitimacy.  It is also 
uncertain if such an agreement or plan has established the pedigree to 
demonstrate that the practice has in fact been “systematic [and] unbroken,” 
factors that are also vital to determining its constitutional status. 
3.  Legitimacy 
With respect to political legitimacy, confidential letter arrangements or 
contingency plans are on shakier ground.102  Instances of presidential death 
have prompted great outpourings of public grief and unease.  But, at least in 
these situations, vice presidential succession was a given.  The public knew 
that the Vice President was there to serve this purpose.  With dual incapacity, 
there would be the usual public grief and unease surrounding the 
officeholders’ inability, but these sentiments would be greatly magnified by 
the unprecedented uncertainty as to who would be running the executive 
branch and how the dilemma would be resolved.  An officeholder that 
suddenly emerges and claims the presidency by brandishing a letter 
 
 99. FEERICK, supra note 4, at 293; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 26 n.20. 
 100. See FEERICK, supra note 4, at 224 n.†, 293; Feerick, supra note 1, at 24–25; see also 
CHENEY WITH CHENEY, supra note 51, at 319–22; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 26–27; 
cf. PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY:  PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ISSUES OF INABILITY AND DISABILITY ABOUT PRESIDENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 276 (James F. Toole & Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001).   
 101. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 (1929) (“[A] practice of at least twenty 
years duration ‘on the part of the executive department, acquiesced in by the legislative 
department, while not absolutely binding on the judicial department, is entitled to great regard, 
in determining the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is 
in any respect of doubtful meaning.’” (quoting State ex rel. Norwalk v. Town of South 
Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 264 (1904))). 
 102. Cf. Torricelli Memorandum, supra note 93, at 4–5 (articulating the importance of 
reassuring the public in an inability scenario by making such agreements public ahead of time); 
Wiggins Memorandum, supra note 91, at 2 (same). 
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arrangement or contingency plan that no one (or virtually no one) in 
Congress—let alone the general public—had ever seen would almost 
certainly find himself in a situation that would be deeply unsettling to 
American citizens.103 
In past situations involving presidential incapacity, rumors and conspiracy 
theories swirled with great intensity;104 the age of the internet, social media, 
“fake news,” and twenty-four-hour cable networks would almost certainly 
compound these concerns.  Thus, the public would likely greet an individual 
claiming to be Acting President based solely on a secret letter arrangement 
or contingency plan with deep skepticism.  This would be all the more true if 
that individual was the Speaker and came from the opposite party of the 
President and Vice President.  Though they meet the practicality requirement, 
secret letter arrangements and contingency plans have an uncertain legal 
status and would likely create serious legitimacy problems. 
B.  The Contingent Grant-of-Power Theory 
The CGOPT is one potential way to address dual incapacity.105  The theory 
has its origins in the debates that occurred about how to resolve presidential 
incapacity prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification.106  The 
argument is that the individual receiving a grant of contingent authority 
should be the one to determine under what circumstances that power should 
be exercised.107  Thus, in the context of presidential inability prior to the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, some thought that the Vice President had the sole 
authority to determine if the President was unable to fulfill his duties since 
the former was assigned by the Constitution to fill in for an incapacitated 
President. 
The same principle might conceivably be applied today in the context of 
dual incapacity.  Even though the 1947 statute does not clearly grant such 
discretion to the Speaker,108 as next in line to the presidency, he might still 
be seen as having the discretion by himself to determine if the President and 
Vice President are incapacitated.  Once that determination was made, the 
 
 103. This, of course, counsels in favor of letter arrangements or contingency plans (or at 
least their contours) being made public as they essentially were prior to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 934–35.  For the public nature of 
earlier letter arrangements, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.   
 104. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 3, at 922; Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior 
in a Disability Crisis:  The Case of Thomas R. Marshall, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 37, 
43; cf. William F. Baker & Beth A. FitzPatrick, Presidential Succession Scenarios in Popular 
Culture and History and the Need for Reform, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 835, 841 (2010). 
 105. Indeed, like several options discussed in this Article, it could be implemented through 
a letter agreement or contingency plan. 
 106. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 88–89 (1961); Brownell, supra note 
12, at 203–06, 208; Feerick, supra note 3, at 912–14; Feerick, supra note 1, at 20–21; First 
Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 30. 
 107. See, e.g., Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. at 88–89; SILVA, supra note 8, at 
55, 100–03; Brownell, supra note 12, at 203–06; Feerick, supra note 3, at 938–42; cf. Martin 
v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30–32 (1827); 
 108. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 21. 
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Speaker would become Acting President.109  Viewed another way, the 
CGOPT could involve interpreting the presidential succession statute as 
implicitly delegating this decision-making authority to the Speaker.  There is 
even some legislative history from 1947 that provides some modest support 
for this notion.110 
The approach might be effectuated through a preexisting secret letter 
arrangement or contingency plan among the President, Vice President, and 
the Speaker (assuming such an arrangement exists), or perhaps carried out 
“on the fly” through an ad hoc legal decision by executive branch lawyers or 
the Speaker’s office.111 
This proposed solution could also be seen to dovetail with Justice Robert 
Jackson’s reasoning in his famed concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.112  Justice Jackson wrote that Presidents on occasion can take 
action in areas where Congress has not legislated: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial 
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there 
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility.  In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on 
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law.113 
In keeping with Justice Jackson’s reasoning, courts have often read 
congressional silence to mean that the President is tacitly authorized to take 
action, or is at least not prohibited from doing so.  This is particularly true 
when the nation’s security is implicated.114  For reasons stated earlier,115 the 
nation’s security would undoubtedly be at risk if it had no functioning 
 
 109. See Feerick, supra note 3, at 938–39. 
 110. It was widely acknowledged in the legislative history that the 1947 statute was 
purposefully silent on deciding who should determine executive inability and how such a 
determination should be carried out. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 80-80, at 4 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 
7696–98 (1947) (statements of Sens. Wherry and Hatch); id. at 7706 (statement of Sen. 
Wherry); id. at 7711–12 (statement of Sen. Wherry); id. at 7775–76, 7779 (statements of Sens. 
Hatch, Wherry, Barkley, and Baldwin); id. at 7783 (statement of Sen. Green); id. at 8620, 
8624, 8628–30 (statements of Reps. Michener, Celler, Kefauver, Walter, and Gwynne).  That 
said, the Senate sponsor and chief advocate of the measure, Senator Kenneth Wherry, 
speculated that the Speaker or PPT would make the actual decision about executive inability 
if needed. Id. at 7697, 7779 (statement of Sen. Wherry); see also id. at 7775 (statement of Sen. 
Barkley).  Neither the 1792 nor the 1886 succession laws addressed who decided dual 
incapacity and how. See id. at 7706, 7775 (statement of Sen. Wherry). 
 111. For a discussion of letter arrangements and contingency plans, see supra Part III.A. 
 112. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  The potential application of 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence to this discussion benefitted greatly from conversations with 
Professor Joel Goldstein. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–79 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321–
22 (1936). 
 115. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
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President.  Since Congress in the 1947 presidential succession statute was 
silent as to who decides dual incapacity and how, Justice Jackson’s legal 
reasoning might apply in this context. 
In the context of implementing the CGOPT, the Speaker’s status could be 
likened to that of the President in Justice Jackson’s opinion.  The rationale 
would be that the Speaker in this instance (1) would be trying to ensure 
presidential continuity consistent with the constitutional principle that 
executive branch leadership must be maintained and (2) would be acting as 
the heir apparent to the presidency.  As a result, an argument might be 
fashioned that, through these links to the presidency, the Speaker would be 
stepping into the shoes of the executive and taking actions in the “zone of 
twilight” left by the 1947 law, even though the Speaker, in making the 
inability decision, would not yet be Acting President.116 
1.  Advantages 
The primary advantage of applying the CGOPT to a dual-incapacity 
scenario is that it has the potential to be effectuated quickly.  The Speaker 
could conceivably arrive at a determination in fairly short order.117  The 
Speaker’s office might hold a public ceremony announcing that he would be 
assuming the role of Acting President until such time as either the President 
or Vice President has regained capacity.118  All of this could be carried out 
in an expeditious manner, thus minimizing any lengthy de facto interregnum.  
In this regard, the CGOPT has a potential practical benefit. 
2.  Drawbacks 
The CGOPT faces a number of daunting challenges, however.  First, prior 
to the enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, no Vice President adopted 
the CGOPT to determine presidential inability.  During the lengthy 
incapacity of President James Garfield, Vice President Chester Arthur could 
have applied some form of this theory.119  Similarly, during the extended 
incapacity of President Woodrow Wilson, Vice President Thomas Marshall 
could have done the same.  Tellingly, neither did so.120  In fact, to the extent 
that steps were taken to try to manage these instances of executive inability, 
they were taken by the Cabinet and presidential confidantes, not by the Vice 
 
 116. Under the proposal recommended in this Article, the Speaker would have an even 
better claim to being treated like the President in Justice Jackson’s formulation. See infra Part 
IV.  This is because he would be gaining approval for his actions from a majority of the 
Cabinet, the remaining nonincapacitated leaders of the executive branch. 
 117. It is hard to imagine the Speaker taking any action unless the dual incapacity were 
fairly obvious. 
 118. The Speaker’s legal opinion would presumably explain the CGOPT approach and the 
legislative history supporting his claim. 
 119. The CGOPT was articulated at the time of President Garfield’s incapacity. See Ruth 
C. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 155 (1957). 
 120. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 117–39, 162–80 (1965); Goldstein, supra note 104, at 37. 
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President.121  Clearly, to some degree, the theory lacked sufficient 
constitutional currency and legitimacy to be applied in a real-world setting.122 
Moreover, although the CGOPT was embraced by three Attorneys 
General,123 the validity of the theory was hotly disputed until the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment was adopted.124  Prior to the Amendment, some authorities 
maintained that the President and Vice President should jointly decide 
questions of presidential incapacity; others believed that Congress alone or 
the Vice President and Cabinet should make the determination.  Still others 
argued that the courts should have the final say.125  Nor were these the only 
options debated.126 
Second, having the Speaker make the decision all by himself does not sit 
easily alongside the structural norms of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.127  It provides that the Vice President determine the President’s 
incapacity with the Cabinet (or with a statutorily created body).128  Then, if 
the President disputes the matter, it is referred to Congress to decide.129  
Thus, important checks and balances were built into Section 4 to prevent 
precipitate action by a power-hungry Vice President.130  At the same time, 
Cabinet participation in the initial determination provides the Vice President 
with political cover.131  To this end, it permits the Vice President to act in the 
public interest by doing what needs to be done regarding presidential 
incapacity while protecting him against charges of trying to usurp the highest 
office in the land.132  In this respect, the checks and balances serve two 
worthy purposes:  (1) deterring the overly ambitious and (2) encouraging the 
overly reticent.133 
 
 121. See SILVA, supra note 8, at 140–48; Brownell, supra note 12, at 193–95. 
 122. Concern about appearing to be overly anxious to assume the presidency while the 
chief executive was ailing was a major reason why Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall did 
not try to determine presidential incapacity. See, e.g., Brownell, supra note 12, at 193–95.  
Constitutional questions over whether the Vice President had the authority to determine 
presidential inability in the first place—as well as concerns over permanently displacing the 
President—blended together with a wariness of being seen to be usurping high office to form 
a significant deterrent to vice presidential action. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 
69, 86–87 (1961); FEERICK, supra note 120, at 134–35; FEERICK, supra note 4, at 8–10, 14–17; 
Brownell, supra note 12, at 193–95; Goldstein, supra note 104, at 43–47.  Had the Vice 
President’s authority been crystal clear, Arthur and Marshall would probably still have been 
hesitant to take any action, but they certainly would have been more likely to take such steps 
with clear authority than without it. See 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 60, at 67–68 
(statement of American Bar Association); Goldstein, supra note 104, at 46–47. 
 123. Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. at 88–89, 94. 
 124. Id. at 89–90; FEERICK, supra note 4, at 49–50. 
 125. See FEERICK, supra note 120, at 134–35.  For conflicting proposals at the time of 
President’s Garfield’s incapacity, see id.; SILVA, supra note 8, at 100–11; Silva, supra note 
119, at 155. 
 126. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 21; First Clinic Report, supra note 1, at 30–31; supra 
Part I. 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 131. See id. at 21; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 964. 
 132. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 21; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 964. 
 133. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 21; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 964. 
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Thus, in addition to running afoul of Section 4 constitutional norms, as a 
practical matter, the Speaker would be placed in the same excruciating 
position as Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall and could well hesitate to 
assume the reins of executive office when he should take them.134  The 
Speaker’s position would be all the more acute if he hailed from a different 
political party from the President and Vice President and his action would 
result in a switch in partisan control of the White House.135 
The CGOPT is discordant for a third, and closely related, reason.  It means 
that, when the President alone is incapacitated, there is an elaborate set of 
checks and balances that must be complied with before he can be removed 
from office for inability.  But, when the President is incapacitated at the same 
time as the Vice President—an even more high-stakes situation—he can 
suddenly be removed from office for inability by one person with no checks 
and balances at all.  That is deeply problematic. 
A fourth shortcoming of the CGOPT is how the President and Vice 
President could regain their offices if they recovered their capacity.  Prior to 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, three Attorneys General concluded that an 
incapacitated President could return to office simply by asserting that he had 
regained capacity.136  Thus, under the CGOPT, the President and Vice 
President would presumably make the decision to return to office all by 
themselves.  Such a mechanism again lacks the formal checks and balances 
established under Section 4.  The Amendment provides that the Vice 
President and Cabinet must tacitly agree that the President is in fact no longer 
incapacitated, and if there is a dispute, Congress decides the issue.  These 
checks help ensure that the President has, in reality, regained his capacity.  
The CGOPT would include no such assurances; a mentally deranged 
President or Vice President, for example, could simply state he is ready to 
return to the Oval Office and that would be the end of it (assuming the 
Speaker does not trigger the inability process all over again).  Once again, 
the CGOPT falls short of Section 4’s constitutional norms. 
Finally, the CGOPT is freighted by a major legitimacy concern:  the 
Speaker determining dual incapacity all by himself.  The CGOPT counsels 
that, since the Speaker is next in the line of succession, he would have the 
sole responsibility for determining that the President and Vice President are 
incapacitated.137  He alone would then publicly proclaim himself Acting 
President.  This is a jarring prospect and could unintentionally project coup-
like overtones. 
In sum, the CGOPT is a mixed bag as to practicality, and serious concerns 
exist regarding its legality and political legitimacy, making it a troubling 
proposition to embrace. 
 
 134. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 19. 
 135. Concerns over a potential partisan shift in the White House if the President and Vice 
President cannot serve reflect one of the many drawbacks of the 1947 presidential succession 
statute. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 4, at 214, 287. 
 136. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 89, 91 (1961). 
 137. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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C.  The Reagan-Bush-Clinton Contingency Plans 
It will be recalled that the Reagan administration contingency plan would 
have had the Speaker and the Cabinet determine dual incapacity and then 
alert party leaders in Congress.138  The Bush and Clinton plans echoed this 
approach.139  Putting to one side legal concerns about the secret nature of 
these efforts,140 the substance of the Reagan-Bush-Clinton conception merits 
review as they are the only dual incapacity contingency plans that are 
publicly accessible. 
Notably, the Reagan-Bush-Clinton administration contingency plans 
openly concede their legal shortcomings.  They cautiously suggest that they 
are only providing “[o]ne way” to try to resolve the situation.141  The 
documents state frankly that “no guidance can be given [regarding dual 
incapacity] with any legal certainty.”142  Elsewhere, they admit that there “are 
serious difficulties” with their approach.143 
While the memoranda do not fully spell out the approach’s legal 
shortcomings,144 they do include the fact that the Presidential Succession Act 
 
 138. See Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2–3. 
 139. See Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2.   
 140. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 141. See Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2; Reagan Contingency Plans, 
supra note 95, tab G, at 2.  
 142. Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2; Reagan Contingency Plans, 
supra note 95, tab G, at 2.  
 143. See Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 1; Reagan Contingency Plans, 
supra note 95, tab G, at 1.  The Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans for addressing dual incapacity 
followed the contours of a proposal discussed but apparently never adopted during the Carter-
Mondale administration.  Members of the Vice President’s counsel’s office thought the 
Speaker and the Cabinet should work together to resolve matters but were concerned about 
the fragile legal justification undergirding such an approach. See Wiggins Memorandum, 
supra note 91, at 6, 8 (“What is to happen if both the President and the Vice President are 
unable to function?  Though the enquiry was not lost on the Congress neither was there any 
attempt to deal with the problem.  A very weak statutory response is available.  [Under the 
1947 statute,] . . . crushingly, there are no procedures articulated for the decision . . . .  I am 
persuaded—and [Deputy Counsel to the Vice President] Marilyn [Haft] concurs with this—
that the Speaker and the Cabinet ought to make the decision to oust the Vice President.”). 
 144. The legal concerns raised by the White House Counsel’s Office muddy the waters a 
bit.  The memoranda conflate analyses of two different inability situations:  “[t]emporary 
disability of both the President and the Vice President simultaneously” and “[t]emporary 
disability of the President and the death of the Vice President.” Clinton Contingency Plans, 
supra note 95, tab G, at 1; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 1.  This in turn 
leads to the memoranda somewhat blurring the lines between Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and the 1947 statute, which draws authority from Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.  
In reality, each law deals with a different scenario. 
The memoranda read that regarding both a dual-incapacity scenario and a disabled-
President-and-dead-Vice President scenario, 
a determination of Presidential inability to govern would clearly be necessary before 
the Speaker could act as President.  Whatever procedure is used to make this 
determination, since the Vice President by reason of his own inability or death could 
not participate in the decision, the [1947] Act necessarily contemplates a 
determination of Presidential inability that is at odds with the 25th Amendment 
procedure. 
Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 1; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 
95, tab G, at 2.  The problem with merging discussion of these two scenarios is that dual 
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is completely silent on how and by whom the inability determination should 
be effectuated.  Essentially, the memoranda attempt to “fill in the blanks” of 
the statute by doing the work assigned to Congress under the Dual Inability 
and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.  This secret “statutory rewrite” would 
therefore face serious hurdles. 
The Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans also likely entail legitimacy concerns.  
For whatever reason, the memoranda do not place emphasis on the need for 
public awareness of the plan, as did the proposals under the Ford and Carter 
administrations.145  The result would be that, under the Reagan-Bush-Clinton 
plans, an unprecedented crisis in government would be met by a secret 
agreement sprung for the first time on a public already reeling from political 
uncertainty.146  Moreover, the Speaker and Cabinet’s decision would lack the 
imprimatur of Congress, which, in the context of succession and disability, 
has been seen as a proxy for the public.147 
In theory, the Reagan-Bush-Clinton administration plans, due to the 
inclusion of the Cabinet in the decision-making, would seem to entail a 
slower process than the CGOPT approach since the latter only provides that 
the Speaker take action.  In reality, the Reagan administration plan would 
almost certainly be effectuated more quickly than the CGOPT since it would 
provide cover for the Speaker by including the Cabinet in decision-making.  
As a result, the Speaker would be more apt to take action since he would be 
less likely to be tarred publicly as a usurper.148 
 
incapacity is addressed by the 1947 statute (and only informed by Section 4 norms), cf. 
Interview with Sen. Bayh, supra note 11, at 804 (quoting John Feerick); Second Clinic Report, 
supra note 12, at 959 n.256, whereas a disabled-President-and-dead-Vice President situation 
is addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (and only informed by the 1947 statute). 
In the dual-incapacity scenario, because it involves the 1947 statute and not Section 4 per 
se (in which the Vice President is an essential actor), the fact the Vice President is not part of 
the inability determination process is beside the point.  With dual incapacity, the issue is that 
constitutional norms established by Section 4 should be complied with even if they may not 
be legally required.  Those norms, it will be recalled, are (1) participation by the successor in 
the inability determination, (2) participation by the Cabinet in the process, and (3) an 
opportunity for the President to appeal the decision.  These constitutional norms would be all 
the more important if, in a dual-incapacity scenario, the President attempts to return to office 
prior to the Vice President, which would very closely approximate a Section 4 scenario in 
which only an incapacitated President is involved. 
In a disabled-President-and-dead-Vice President scenario, on the other hand, the analysis 
would directly involve Section 4 as the situation involves the President alone being 
incapacitated.  For this reason, the fact the Vice President would not be involved in the inability 
decision-making process would indeed be “at odds with the 25th Amendment procedure” as 
the Vice President is essential to such a determination under Section 4. Clinton Contingency 
Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 1; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2.  In 
this situation, the memoranda essentially argue that the 1947 statute would inform application 
of this Section 4 situation. Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 1; Reagan 
Contingency Plans, supra note 95, tab G, at 2–3. 
 145. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, supra note 60, at 9 (advocating that 
any letter arrangement be made public); Torricelli Memorandum, supra note 93, at 4–5 (same). 
 146. Cf. Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 934–35. 
 147. Id. at 973. 
 148. The Reagan-Bush-Clinton contingency plans also suffer from practical problems.  
They omit the PPT, which might bruise the institutional pride of the Senate since the House—
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The Reagan-Bush-Clinton administration plans also fare better than the 
CGOPT in meeting the constitutional norms established by Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  The plans include the Cabinet in the decision-
making process, as does Section 4.  However, the Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans 
still fall short of the bar set by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  They provide 
no means for the President (or Vice President) to appeal the decision made 
by the Speaker and Cabinet.  Section 4, of course, provides such a 
mechanism. 
In sum, the Reagan-Bush-Clinton administration plans are preferable to 
the CGOPT on all three grounds.  But, as will be seen, the proposal put 
forward in this Article is superior to the Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans because 
it rests on surer legal footing and would likely enjoy greater public 
legitimacy. 
D.  Congress Passes a Statute Before the Speaker 
Becomes Acting President 
Yet another option would be for Congress to pass legislation clearly 
assigning responsibility for deciding presidential and vice presidential 
incapacity.149  The measure would also lay out a postenactment process that 
the Speaker would need to follow to make this determination and a process 
for how the President and Vice President could regain office.  Upon adoption 
of the bill, the Speaker (or other statutorily named designee) would follow 
the guidelines of the legislation and, upon the process’s completion, the 
Speaker would become Acting President.  Assuming the statute is otherwise 
constitutional, the measure has the benefit of being based upon reliable 
constitutional authority150 and it would likely enjoy political legitimacy.  The 
problem is that it is fatally flawed due to its impracticality. 
Ex ante legislation has the obvious advantage of being based on solid 
constitutional footing.  As the measure would address head-on how to deal 
with dual incapacity, it would draw authority from the Dual Inability and the 
Necessary and Proper Clauses.  The bill would simply amend the 1947 
succession statute. 
Moreover, having Congress—as the people’s representatives—determine 
the means for deciding presidential and vice presidential inability would help 
ensure that this approach would enjoy political legitimacy.151  The 
determination would involve a public process undertaken by the nation’s 
representatives, not a secret arrangement sprung suddenly on the citizenry.152  
Short of a special election, which would be wholly impracticable given the 
immediate need for a President, having Congress weigh in would seem the 
most democratic approach to installing an Acting President. 
 
as represented by the Speaker—would be included in decision-making but not the upper 
chamber. 
 149. See Feerick, supra note 3, at 939. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 973. 
 152. See id. at 934–35, 973. 
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The advantages of constitutionality and legitimacy are easily overcome, 
however, by this approach’s practical limitations.  The reality is that this 
option would ensure a de facto lapse in executive authority.  Passing a statute 
is not usually a brisk process.  Moreover, even if Congress passed legislation 
on the very day that the dual incapacity began—a highly unlikely event—it 
would take at least eleven days before there would be a functioning chief 
executive.153  That would be because, without a functioning President, 
legislation takes ten days to be enacted (not counting Sundays).154  Eleven 
days without a functioning chief executive is far too long.  And that does not 
even include the time it would take to implement the dual-incapacity 
mechanism created by the statute. 
All of this, of course, assumes Congress would be in session.  The House 
and Senate are often out of session, and it takes time for them to assemble.  
If Congress were out of session and the United States were involved in a 
crisis of some sort that required immediate presidential leadership, waiting 
for Congress to reconvene and legislate would not make sense.  If one factors 
in the implementation of the inability process created by such a statute, the 
American public could be without a President for weeks.  Thus, while an ex 
ante statute has the benefits of clear constitutionality and solid political 
legitimacy, it utterly fails as a practical matter. 
E.  Impeachment 
A final alternative could be the impeachment process.  With dual 
incapacity, both the President and Vice President would need to be 
impeached and removed.  This approach would not work well for several 
reasons. 
For one, much like the previous option, it would be a highly time-
consuming exercise and the nation would need a chief executive 
immediately.  Impeachments, requiring extensive fact finding and 
investigation, are typically time-consuming affairs.155  Thus, as a practical 
matter, impeachment fails as an option for the same reason that passing an ex 
ante statute would also fall short. 
Furthermore, this approach carries with it constitutional problems.  
Foremost among them is that removal from office for incapacity would seem 
to fall outside of the express language of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”156  
Moreover, while there was some support for use of the impeachment process 
in the public debates that preceded the Amendment in the 1950s and early 
1960s,157 the legislative history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is less 
 
 153. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Brownell, supra note 12, at 201. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  That said, impeachment proceedings against federal judges 
have involved mental incapacity and drunkenness on the bench, neither of which is intuitively 
a high crime or misdemeanor. See, e.g., Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 
54 AM. HIST. REV. 485 (1949). 
 157. See Presidential Inability:  Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of 
Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 30 (1957) (statement of 
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favorable to impeachment as an inability option.158  Indeed, had the 
impeachment process been thought sufficient to address inability, there 
would have been no need for the Amendment in the first place. 
In addition, impeachment involves removing the President and Vice 
President permanently from their positions.159  As such, it lacks the flexibility 
of the approach recommended in this Article.  For example, what would 
happen if the President and Vice President both awoke from comas?  Had 
they been impeached and removed, they would not be able to return to office. 
Even if impeachment were to be interpreted broadly and pragmatically to 
permit its use to resolve a dual-incapacity situation, it would prompt serious 
concerns regarding political legitimacy.  This is because the public rightly 
associates impeachment with malfeasance.160  To remove an incapacitated 
President and Vice President from office would almost certainly stigmatize 
them at a time when there would likely be a great outpouring of sympathy 
for the officeholders and their families.161  Moreover, there has never been a 
simultaneous impeachment of a President and Vice President, which would 
add further confusion and disquiet to an already unprecedented and 
exceedingly difficult situation.162  As with the four prior options, 
impeachment falls short in the context of addressing dual incapacity. 
IV.  THE RECOMMENDED APPROACH:  
THE SPEAKER, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, AND CABINET DETERMINE DUAL 
INCAPACITY AND REQUEST CONGRESSIONAL RATIFICATION 
This Article recommends that the Speaker formally initiate action.  His 
first step would be to consult with the PPT and the Cabinet and for the group 
to come to a decision.163  Following agreement by the Speaker, the PPT, and 
 
Herbert Brownell, Att’y Gen.); Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 91 (1961); 
FEERICK, supra note 4, at 51, 127 n.284, 365; The President’s News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 
241, 245 (Apr. 3, 1957); Brownell, supra note 12, at 197–98, 201, 204; John D. Feerick, The 
Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 
127 (1963). 
 158. See 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 60, at 32 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); id. 
at 61 n.3 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-Elect, American Bar Association); see 
also Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 24 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating); Presidential Inability:  
Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res. 35, and S.J. Res. 84 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 58–59 (1963) (statement of Sen. 
Roman Hruska). 
 159. See FEERICK, supra note 4, at 51. 
 160. See Brownell, supra note 12, at 201; see also Feerick, supra note 157, at 115. 
 161. Cf. Brownell, supra note 12, at 201. 
 162. The nation was faced with the prospect of dual impeachment in 1973 when both 
President Richard Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew were simultaneously under 
investigation for criminal wrongdoing. See JULES WITCOVER, VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:  
THE SHORT AND UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF RICHARD NIXON AND SPIRO AGNEW 297 (2007).  Both 
resigned before impeachment and removal could take place. 
 163. Cf. Feerick, supra note 1, at 21; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 965–66.  The 
group would likely consult with others such as relatives of the President and Vice President, 
doctors, White House staff, and government attorneys. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 1, at 21. 
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a majority of the Cabinet that the Speaker (or another successor) should 
become Acting President, the group would call for Congress to ratify the 
decision they made and the process they followed. 
A.  Arguments in Favor of This Approach 
1.  Legality 
The group’s position would be legally defensible but far from 
unassailable.164  As will be discussed, the legal opinion should emphasize (1) 
the Speaker’s authority, such as it is, under the CGOPT and the 1947 Act’s 
legislative history, (2) the PPT’s debatable authority under the CGOPT as it 
relates to the Vice President, and (3) compliance with Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment norms that provide for Cabinet participation in an executive 
branch inability determination.  The group should then publicly announce its 
decision, articulate its legal position, and formally request legislation from 
Congress.165 
The legislative request should include the following elements: (1) 
ratification of the process and the decision arrived at by the Speaker, PPT, 
and majority of the Cabinet, (2) adoption of a statutory process patterned after 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment whereby the President and Vice 
President can regain their offices, and (3) establishment of a procedure for 
determining future cases of dual incapacity (including anticipated dual 
incapacity).  The request should also include proposed internal rule changes 
in each chamber of Congress to require a two-thirds vote in each body to 
overturn a misguided declaration by either the President or Vice President as 
to their fitness to return to office.  Thus, the proposed statute would continue 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment presumptions that the two incapacitated 
officeholders may appeal the initial incapacity decision and should be able to 
return to their positions when they believe they are ready, subject to certain 
checks and balances.166 
a.  Inclusion of the Cabinet 
As discussed earlier, in this setting the Speaker may well draw authority 
from the CGOPT, such as it is.  But the question remains:  why does the 
Cabinet need to participate in this process?  There are several potential 
reasons.  First, participation by Cabinet members would be justified on the 
grounds that, as members of the line of presidential succession, they too could 
conceivably need to act as successor and take action under the CGOPT.  It is, 
after all, the contingent grant-of-power theory and each member of the group 
(unless otherwise disqualified) could become Acting President under certain 
circumstances.  They would need to be kept apprised of such circumstances 
 
 164. See supra Part III. 
 165. Cf. LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER:  A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF 
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES 19, 101–02, 193 (1943) (discussing the occasional 
need of the President to transgress statutes during emergencies).   
 166. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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and be ready to act.  The Speaker might also be seen as cloaking the other 
participants in his own contingent grant of power (CGOP). 
Second, even though the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not encompass 
dual incapacity,167 structural factors from the Amendment should be 
imported into this decision-making process because presidential removal for 
incapacity is involved.  These factors are that there should be (1) participation 
by the successor in the inability determination, (2) participation by the 
Cabinet, and (3) an opportunity for the President to appeal the decision.  
These constitutional norms should not be breached simply because the Vice 
President also happens to be incapacitated.168  Having the Speaker, PPT, a 
majority of the Cabinet, and ultimately Congress decide satisfies these 
factors. 
The final rationale for Cabinet inclusion stems from practical 
considerations.169  The Speaker, the PPT, and Cabinet members each have a 
potential stake in the decision-making, which makes their inclusion 
important.  For example, suppose the Secretary of State believes that 
legislative succession is unconstitutional and wishes to overturn the 
executive branch’s longstanding position on the matter.170  The Speaker, the 
PPT, and a majority of the Cabinet would need to resolve this matter in their 
deliberations.171  Everyone with a stake in the outcome of that decision 
should be included. 
b.  Inclusion of the PPT 
Inclusion of the Cabinet seems fairly intuitive given the provisions of 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the fact they are the most 
senior, nonincapacitated members of the executive branch, but what about 
the PPT?  Why would he be included?  Perhaps the better question is why 
would he not be?  First, as the next in the line of succession after the Speaker, 
the PPT has a potential link to the CGOPT, indeed a closer one than members 
of the Cabinet.172  After all, if the Speaker is unable to serve as Acting 
President or does not otherwise qualify, the PPT would need to draw upon 
the very same CGOPT to initiate action to become Acting President. 
 
 167. See, e.g., Interview with Sen. Bayh, supra note 11, at 804; supra Part I. 
 168. The high procedural hurdles in the impeachment process further reinforce the theory 
that there should be a procedural floor that should be factored in when considering removal of 
a President. See Brownell, supra note 12, at 209. 
 169. Another practical factor is simply that the Speaker can and should consult with 
whomever he wants while making the incapacity determination. Cf. Presidential Inability, 42 
Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 93 (1961) (discussing the comparable right of the Vice President to make 
a determination of presidential inability); Brownell, supra note 12, at 203. 
 170. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; infra Part V.A. 
 171. It would be challenging for individuals outside of the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet 
secretaries to mount a political or legal challenge to the Speaker becoming Acting President 
in favor of the Secretary of State if the latter had already conceded that the Speaker has the 
rightful authority. 
 172. This, of course, assumes that legislative succession is constitutional and, as a purely 
abstract legal matter, it may not be. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  That said, there 
are serious practical reasons why the PPT would not be easily excluded from the line of 
succession. See infra Part V.A. 
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A hypothetical helps illustrate this in more tangible terms.  Assume the 
PPT is excluded from the Speaker’s consultations with the Cabinet.  During 
the deliberations, doctors inform the Speaker and the Cabinet that the 
President and Vice President are likely to regain their capacity within six 
weeks.  The Speaker gets “cold feet” and announces he believes there is a 
need for an Acting President but that he does want to resign from the House 
as he would be required to do under the 1947 succession law.173  He, 
therefore, decides that the succession should skip over him to the PPT.174  At 
this point, the CGOP would rest with the PPT, but the PPT would not even 
be “in the room.”  At this stage, the group would have exhausted its legal 
authority to act further.  Under Section 4 parallelism, the next in line of 
succession is legally essential to make the inability determination and the 
next in line would be the PPT.  Therefore, as both a theoretical and a practical 
matter, this counsels in favor of having the PPT in the decision-making loop.  
Otherwise, the Speaker and Cabinet would need to track down the PPT and 
waste valuable time bringing him up to speed when he would otherwise be 
fully informed. 
Second, the PPT may enjoy a form of CGOP in relation to the vice 
presidency since, under the Constitution, he takes the place of the Vice 
President when the latter is absent from the upper chamber.175  The PPT’s 
theoretical authority in this regard would bolster that of the Speaker and the 
Cabinet in their decision-making since the group is deciding not only 
presidential incapacity but also vice presidential incapacity.176 
Third, from the Speaker’s standpoint, having the PPT in the room might 
be helpful if questions over the lawfulness of legislative succession arise.  
Indeed, excluding the PPT from deliberations would implicitly discredit that 
very principle.  If one believes in the constitutionality of legislative 
succession, it is difficult to explain the rationale for keeping the second in the 
line of succession out of the deliberations. 
 
 173. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2012).  The Speaker and PPT are not compelled to serve as 
Acting President; they can decline the position. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 44, at 1003–
05; Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 948. 
 174. This is not as outlandish as it may seem.  The uncertain duration of their potential time 
as Acting President might lead the Speaker and PPT to conclude that it is not worth the risk of 
possibly ending their congressional careers. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 44, at 1003–
05. 
 175. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 5; Manning, supra note 8, at 149.  This point benefitted 
from a fruitful discussion with Professor Brian Kalt.  Underscoring the concept of the PPT as 
the Vice President’s successor in certain settings is that during periods of vice presidential 
vacancies, PPTs have been routinely termed “Acting Vice President” in Congress and in the 
press. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1699 (1868) (statement of Sen. Dixon); 
The Matthews Committee, Its Members Announced by Acting Vice-President Ferry, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 1878, at 1; cf. SILVA, supra note 8, at 23–24.  In modern Senate practice, PPTs 
rarely preside over the Senate but the textual linkage between the Vice President and PPT 
remains very much in place. 
 176. In a sense, the PPT’s CGOP might even be preferable to the Speaker’s as the PPT’s 
authority is constitutionally based and not vulnerable to legal challenge as is the Speaker’s, 
which is based upon a statute that some believe is unconstitutional. See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
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Finally, if every member in the line of succession but the PPT is consulted 
and helps decide that the Speaker should become Acting President, it invites 
public or private sniping from the PPT and his allies in the Senate majority.  
This would seem particularly likely if the Senate and House were controlled 
by different political parties.  Criticism coming from the next in line of 
succession could prove highly corrosive to the legitimacy of the Acting 
President’s ability to govern.  Including all possible claimants to the 
presidency would likely lessen the possibility of criticism from other 
potential successors, making the group decision politically harder to oppose.  
Exclusion of the PPT might also offend the institutional pride of the Senate 
as a whole.  In effect, the House—as represented by the Speaker—could be 
seen as having been included in the dual-inability deliberations, but not the 
Senate.  Including the PPT would also likely help with the retroactive 
legislative effort.  Excluding him might hinder such an undertaking. 
c.  Inclusion of Congress 
The next step—retroactive congressional sanction of the process followed 
and decision rendered—has the benefit of enhancing both the legality and the 
legitimacy of the actions taken.  As a constitutional matter, securing 
congressional approval of the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet’s actions would 
cure any constitutional defects.  This is because the legislation would be 
based on the Dual Inability177 and Necessary and Proper Clauses,178 which 
authorize Congress to take action in this area.  Ratification, which would 
include a proposed mechanism for the President and Vice President to regain 
their jobs, would also satisfy Section 4 constitutional norms. 
The post hoc ratification of extraordinary presidential measures is firmly 
grounded in law and historical precedent.  With respect to the law, post hoc 
congressional ratification has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court on 
several occasions and would give support to the actions of the Speaker, PPT, 
and a majority of the Cabinet.179 
Regarding historical precedent, the actions taken and justifications given 
by two of the nation’s foremost presidents and political thinkers reflect the 
viability of taking action in extraordinary circumstances and then seeking 
post hoc ratification.  President Thomas Jefferson’s effort to acquire the 
Louisiana Territory from France in 1803 is one such example.180  In that 
instance, Jefferson took steps to commit the nation to purchase the French 
land even though there was no express constitutional provision granting the 
 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 178. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 179. See, e.g., Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 119 (1947); 
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 357, 360–61 (1941); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 
300 U.S. 139, 147 (1937); see also Robert L. Borosage, Para-Legal Authority and Its Perils, 
40 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 166, 177–78 (1976). 
 180. See BAILEY, supra note 34, at 176–94.   
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President (or indeed the nation) the authority to acquire territory from another 
country.181 
Jefferson himself believed he was acting beyond the Constitution’s writ.  
He conceded, “The Constitution has made no provision for our holding 
foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union.  
The executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the 
good of their country, have done an act beyond the Constitution.”182 
Yet, Jefferson also recognized that time was of the essence given the 
French diplomatic posture.183  He saw that adding the Louisiana Territory to 
the United States would double the size of the nation and resolve pivotal 
security and economic concerns for the United States by ensuring access to 
the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.  The President was faced with 
extraordinary circumstances and he needed to act despite the seemingly 
extraconstitutional nature of the steps he took.  He committed the nation and 
then sought congressional sanction. 
In so doing, Jefferson pleaded with one lawmaker:  “I pretend to no right 
to bind you:  you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can:  
I thought it my duty to risk myself for you.”184  The President advocated that 
the Senate sanction his actions through the proposed treaty with France he 
was submitting: 
The Legislature is casting behind them metaphysical subtleties, and risking 
themselves like faithful servants, [who] must ratify & pay for it, and throw 
themselves on their country for doing for them unauthorized, what we know 
they would have done for themselves had they been in a situation to do 
it.185 
Ultimately, the Senate gave its approval to the treaty, and Congress as a 
whole implemented the Purchase through a number of measures, essentially 
curing any legal defects caused by Jefferson’s unilateral actions.186 
Another example from the Jefferson presidency is equally instructive.  In 
1807, an American vessel, the USS Chesapeake, was attacked by a British 
ship, signaling that hostilities were at hand.187  Immediately afterward, 
Jefferson took steps on his own accord to prepare the nation for war, which 
 
 181. Id.  Jefferson also may have exceeded his authority in committing taxpayer funds to 
buy the territory. See LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:  PRESIDENTIAL 
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 182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 407, 411 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).  Others at the 
time disagreed with Jefferson’s constitutional assessment. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 99–107 (2001). 
 183. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 182, at 98. 
 184. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge, supra note 182, at 411.  At the 
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the better.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 18, 1803), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-05-02-0343 [https://perma.cc/P6X2-
8H45]; see also 1 ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER 197 n.* (1976). 
 185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge, supra note 182, at 411. 
 186. See BAILEY, supra note 34, at 186–91; CURRIE, supra note 182, at 95–114. 
 187. See SOFAER, supra note 184, at 172. 
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involved the commitment of federal funds without congressional 
appropriation.188  As noted by one authority, Jefferson “made no effort to 
defend the purchases of supplies as being legally authorized.”189 
At the time, Jefferson explained to Congress that 
[t]he moment our peace was threatened, I deemed it indispensable to secure 
a greater provision of those articles of military stores with which our 
magazines were not sufficiently furnished.  To have awaited a previous and 
special sanction by law would have lost occasions which might not be 
retrieved.  I did not hesitate, therefore, to authorize engagements for such 
supplements to our existing stock as would render it adequate to the 
emergencies threatening us; and I trust that the Legislature, feeling the 
same anxiety for the safety of our country, so materially advanced by this 
precaution, will approve, when done, what they would have seen so 
important to be done, if then assembled.190 
As with the Louisiana Purchase, Congress ratified Jefferson’s actions after 
the fact.191 
Three years later, Jefferson justified his actions in a letter: 
After the affair of the Chesapeake, we thought war a very possible result.  
Our magazines were ill[] provided with some necessary articles, nor had 
any appropriations been made for their purchase.  We ventured, however, 
to provide them, and to place our country in safety; and stating the case to 
Congress, they sanctioned the act. 
. . . . 
. . . It is incumbent on those only who accept of great charges, to risk 
themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation, or some of its 
very high interests are at stake.  An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he 
would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which they were not 
intended, and which involved the most important consequences.  The line 
of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is 
bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his 
country and the rectitude of his motives.192 
Unilateral presidential actions, such as responding to the Chesapeake 
situation, were fully justified to Jefferson.  To him, it 
constituted a law of necessity and self-preservation, and rendered the salus 
populi supreme over the written law.  The officer who is called to act on 
this superior ground, does indeed risk himself on the justice of the 
controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to 
incur that risk.  But those controlling powers, and his fellow citizens 
generally, are bound to judge according to the circumstances under which 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 14, 17 (1807); see also CURRIE, supra note 182, at 98–99; 
SOFAER, supra note 184, at 172. 
 191. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 825, 850, 852–53 (1807); see also SOFAER, supra note 184, 
at 172–73.  
 192. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 127, 127–28 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000 ed.). 
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he acted.  They are not to transfer the information of this place or moment 
to the time and place of his action; but to put themselves into his 
situation.193 
Thus, Jefferson reasoned that extraordinary measures may place the 
President in a position where he believes he must act immediately and take 
legally questionable steps to protect the nation.  In such circumstances, the 
third President believed it was incumbent on the chief executive to request 
that Congress ratify such executive actions. 
Nor is this the only occasion when Congress has legally cured questionable 
executive branch action in a time of necessity.194  At the beginning of the 
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally spent federal monies 
without appropriation, dramatically expanded the size of the Army and Navy, 
established a blockade against the South, and suspended habeas corpus.195  
Unilateral presidential actions in this vein—though necessary at the time—
were highly suspect from a constitutional standpoint.196  Lincoln recognized 
this.  As such, he expressed in a message to Congress that 
[t]hese measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under 
what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, 
as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.  It is believed that nothing 
has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress . . . .197 
Ultimately, following his request, Congress legitimized his actions.198 
Lincoln’s actions with respect to the blockade against the South were 
subsequently litigated before the Supreme Court and Lincoln and Congress’s 
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disasters. Id. at 17, 18–19 n.31. 
 195. See, e.g., RANDALL, supra note 34, at 51–52; CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DICTATORSHIP:  CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 224–30 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 196. See, e.g., RANDALL, supra note 34, at 51–53; ROSSITER, supra note 195, at 224–30. 
 197. Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message, July 4, 1861, in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3221, 3225–26 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
 198. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326.  Nine decades later, Justice Robert 
Jackson, in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 
maintained that Lincoln’s actions regarding the suspension of habeas corpus had also been 
cured by retroactive legislation. Id. at 637 n.3. 
2017] SOLVING DUAL INABILITY 1063 
actions were vindicated in the Prize Cases199 decision.  The Court reasoned 
that 
in 1861, we find Congress . . . “approving, legalizing, and making valid all 
the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, &c., as if they had been 
issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the 
Congress of the United States.” 
Without admitting that such an act was necessary under the 
circumstances, it is plain that if the President had in any manner assumed 
powers which it was necessary should have the authority or sanction of 
Congress, that on [a] . . . well known principle of law . . . this ratification 
has operated to perfectly cure the defect.200 
A situation involving simultaneous presidential-vice presidential 
incapacity would constitute a crisis in governance in its own right since the 
country would be without a functioning President.  The circumstances would 
be even more dire if matters required the President’s immediate attention 
(e.g., how to respond to a military threat).  As such, dual incapacity would 
warrant similar unilateral action because, in Jefferson’s words, “the safety of 
the nation [would be] . . . at stake.”201 
In the case of dual incapacity, the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet would be 
following Jefferson’s and Lincoln’s lead by taking legally debatable steps by 
naming the Speaker the Acting President.  But, also like Jefferson and 
Lincoln, they would attempt to have their actions cured by sending a message 
to Congress requesting, among other things, subsequent legislative approval 
of their actions. 
2.  Legitimacy 
The proposal in this Article would also have the benefit of being politically 
legitimate.  Under this approach, PPT and Cabinet approval would be needed 
before the Speaker would become Acting President.  In several ways, that 
adds political legitimacy to the proceedings.202  First, this initial step 
essentially follows the model by which incapacity is determined if the 
President alone is thought to be unable to function in office.  Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment requires that the Vice President secure the 
Cabinet’s approval before the former can become Acting President, and, if 
the incapacity is contested, Congress then decides the matter.203 
The approach outlined in this Article would do largely the same thing:  it 
would provide for a joint Speaker-PPT-Cabinet decision.  The difference is 
that this proposal would include even greater checks and balances than 
Section 4.  It includes an additional actor in the review process—the PPT—
 
 199. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); see also RANDALL, supra note 34, at 55–56. 
 200. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670–71 (second emphasis added) (quoting Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 
ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326). 
 201. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, supra note 192, at 127. 
 202. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 203. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also Clinton Contingency Plans, supra note 95, at 
2; Reagan Contingency Plans, supra note 95, at 2–3. 
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and provides a means for the President and Vice President to get their jobs 
back.  Indeed, Congress would be brought into play even if the matter were 
uncontested by the President or Vice President.  This enhanced parallelism 
should reassure the American public that, while the situation would 
essentially be without precedent, policymakers would be following a familiar 
path, one patterned after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment but with even more 
built-in precautions. 
Further legitimacy would be added by Congress providing a statutory 
mechanism by which the President and Vice President could regain office.  
Ideally, this statutory process would also mimic Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
Second, securing the PPT and the Cabinet’s approval would signal that the 
Speaker was not engaged in a coup.  It would demonstrate that a deliberative 
process had taken place regarding incapacity and that the decision had been 
made with the approval of presidential loyalists (i.e., the Cabinet)204 who are 
themselves linked to the electorate through their Senate confirmations.  The 
Senate would also be represented in the deliberations through the PPT. 
Perhaps even more powerful from a political-legitimacy standpoint would 
be that the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet’s decision would be subsequently 
blessed by the nation’s lawmakers, even if the President and Vice President 
did not contest their own incapacity.  Members of Congress obviously 
represent the American people as a whole.  Therefore, providing the 
legislative branch with such a key role in this process would be a way for the 
American public to participate through their elected representatives.205 
3.  Practicality 
As demonstrated above,206 in a dual-incapacity setting, the country simply 
cannot wait for Congress to pass a statute before an Acting President is 
named.  Given the need to minimize any de facto interregnum, the executive 
branch would need an Acting President immediately. 
On the other hand, if it were obvious to the public that both the President 
and the Vice President were incapacitated, the Speaker of the House—as the 
next in line to succession—would be able to act with dispatch.  After the 
Speaker gained the approval of a majority of the Cabinet and the PPT and 
notified Congress, the Speaker would immediately step into the role of 
Acting President.  In this way, the length of the de facto interregnum would 
be greatly minimized.  Then Congress could take action to ratify what had 
taken place. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, the chances of the Speaker taking timely 
action in this situation would be enhanced because he would have the 
political cover provided not only by the Cabinet but by the PPT. 
 
 204. See 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 60, at 69 (statement of American Bar 
Association); Brownell, supra note 12, at 200. 
 205. See Second Clinic Report, supra note 12, at 973. 
 206. See supra Parts I, III.D. 
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V.  POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS 
There is no ideal solution to an immediate occurrence of dual incapacity.207  
The executive branch has not taken public action to provide a mechanism for 
such a contingency and Congress has not addressed the matter by statute.  
This leaves policymakers with only imperfect options.  Not surprisingly, 
there are several potential counterarguments that could be marshalled against 
the position advocated in this Article. 
A.  Legislative Succession Is Unconstitutional 
One possible criticism is that having the Speaker as a central actor in the 
proposed solution to dual incapacity is misguided as the 1947 presidential 
succession statute may unconstitutionally place legislative officials in the line 
of succession.208  This concern may be particularly acute if the Speaker 
belongs to a different political party from the President and Vice President.  
This in turn might encourage a challenge to the statute and unduly complicate 
resolution of a dual-incapacity situation.  For several reasons this potential 
counterargument is flawed. 
By having the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet consult prior to any decision on 
dual incapacity, this Article’s proposal provides a forum whereby the rival 
claimants can decide the question in a deliberative fashion.  Indeed, the 
conclave might conclude for any number of reasons that the Secretary of 
State (or next eligible Cabinet secretary) should become Acting President 
rather than the Speaker or PPT. 
That said, there are several practical reasons why it would be difficult for 
the Secretary to contest the legal claim of the Speaker to become Acting 
President.  For one, the Secretary’s claim would have to overturn the 
longstanding executive branch interpretation that legislative succession is in 
fact constitutional.209  Legislative succession was first signed into law by 
President George Washington in 1792.210  After removal of legislative branch 
officials from the line of succession in 1886, President Harry Truman 
proposed that they be put back in in what ultimately became the 1947 Act, 
the constitutionality of which was defended by the Acting Attorney General 
at the time.211  As noted earlier, President Johnson entered into a letter 
arrangement with Speaker McCormack whereby the latter would have 
assumed the presidency if the former had become incapacitated.212  In 2007, 
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President George W. Bush issued the National Continuity Policy 
Implementation Plan.213  It makes clear that the executive branch views 
legislative succession as entirely lawful.  The document emphasizes the 
importance of 
[f]acilitat[ing] effective implementation of . . . the Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. § 19).  The executive branch will ensure that 
appropriate support is available to the Vice President, the Speaker of the 
House, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.  The Vice President, 
the Speaker of the House, and the President Pro Tempore should be 
prepared at all times to execute their role as a successor President.214 
Elsewhere the document notes that with respect to succession, “[f]or the 
Presidency, the Constitution and statute establish the Order of Presidential 
Succession for officials who meet the constitutional requirements as follows:  
[t]he Vice President[,] Speaker of the House[,] President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate.”215  In the years since the 1947 Act, other executive branch legal 
opinions and documents from both the Department of Justice and the Office 
of the Counsel to the Vice President have assumed the constitutionality of 
legislative succession.216 
Indeed, the State Department’s own website states that “the Secretary of 
State is fourth in line of succession after the Vice President, the Speaker of 
the House, and the President pro tempore of the Senate.”217  A State 
Department spokesperson recently reiterated that point.218  It would be 
exceedingly difficult for a Secretary of State to claim that he should be the 
Acting President when decades of executive branch public statements and 
legal opinions and the State Department’s own website say otherwise. 
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Moreover, there have been executive branch protocols and contingency 
plans in place for some time that have grown up around the notion of 
legislative succession and have institutionalized it.219  Indeed, the Reagan-
Bush-Clinton contingency plans, formulated by the White House Counsel, 
state that “[t]he answer to the question of who would govern [in a dual 
incapacity scenario] . . . would appear to be . . . that the Speaker of the House 
would ‘act as President.’ . . .  The goal in [that] situation[] would be to have 
the Speaker act as President.”220  If the contents of these White House 
documents are still in place, once again, it would be very hard as a practical 
matter for the Secretary of State—in the midst of an unprecedented governing 
crisis—to repudiate them. 
Legislative succession has also been reiterated by the current 
administration.  In 2017, President Donald Trump asked PPT Orrin Hatch to 
serve as designated survivor and not attend that year’s inauguration.221 
For all of these reasons, the Secretary could very well face a major 
legitimacy problem if he claims to be Acting President.  To the general 
public, the Speaker—and not the Secretary—would likely be seen as the next 
in line.222  That reality manifested itself in 1981 following the attempted 
assassination of President Reagan.  During a White House press conference, 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig appeared to assert that he was next in the 
line of succession after the Vice President.223  This created a media firestorm 
and has since become synonymous (fairly or unfairly) with an official 
attempting to seize authority he does not possess.224  The specter of Haig’s 
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assertion would likely hang over any Secretary contending that he—and not 
the Speaker—is the lawful successor. 
That said, the legitimacy issue may ultimately turn on political context.  
For example, if the presidency and Congress were in different partisan hands 
and a modern-day Charles Guiteau incapacitated both the President and Vice 
President in the name of reversing partisan control of the White House, the 
Speaker and PPT might deem it prudent to stand down and defer to the 
Secretary of State.225  This is all the more reason why this Article 
recommends that all the claimants meet in person to discuss and decide 
matters. 
B.  The Approach Violates Separation of Powers 
A second possible counterargument might be made that including the 
Speaker and PPT in the decision-making process violates separation of 
powers.226  Including the Speaker and the PPT in the initial determination 
process, as this Article proposes, certainly does violate abstract notions of 
separation of powers.  But that is only because the 1947 statute does so.227  
In a perfect world, the line of succession would stay completely within the 
executive branch and run from the Vice President to members of the Cabinet.  
It does not, however, and the Speaker and PPT are included. 
At the same time, it bears remembering that the text of the Constitution 
itself does not reflect an airtight application of separation of powers.228  This 
is certainly true in the incapacity realm as Congress is the ultimate arbiter of 
presidential incapacity under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
Similarly, the Vice President, who is essential to the Section 4 process, is part 
of both political branches with his exact constitutional locus varying 
depending upon the circumstances.229  The Speaker enjoys the CGOP in 
relation to the President by statute, and the PPT would seem to have a 
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constitutionally based form of CGOP in relation to the vice presidency.  As 
such, they need to be included in the inability determination process. 
The only other official who could realistically contest this state of affairs 
would be the Secretary of State (or next in the line of succession) under the 
legal theory that the Speaker is not the lawful successor.230  As noted, under 
such a scenario, the Speaker and the Secretary would be able to pursue their 
competing claims when the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet consult to render the 
dual-incapacity decision.  The decision of the group should essentially 
resolve this constitutional question one way or another.231 
C.  Requesting Authorization from Congress Is Too Risky 
A third potential counterargument would be that seeking congressional 
ratification is gilding the constitutional lily.  Why potentially invite 
constitutional and legitimacy challenges by requesting congressional 
ratification?  With the heightened partisan tensions of today, what if Congress 
were unable or unwilling to act? 
This concern is misplaced for several reasons.  First, as was seen before, 
both the CGOPT and the Reagan-Bush-Clinton plans are far from airtight 
from both constitutional and legitimacy standpoints.232  Indeed, the Reagan-
Bush-Clinton plans openly conceded the shaky legal footing upon which they 
were based.  Further, if there were any question at all about the 
constitutionality and legitimacy of the actions of the Acting President 
(especially given the heightened public concern that would precede and 
accompany his assumption of office), that doubt would need to be eliminated.  
Taking that doubt off the table is what post hoc ratification does.  The 
rationale is similar to that used in 2009 when President Barack Obama retook 
the oath of office after he and Chief Justice John Roberts fumbled the 
wording of the oath the first time:  to remove any doubt of legality and 
legitimacy.233  At the end of the day, Congress has the authority in this realm 
and, therefore, only Congress can ratify the group’s actions. 
Second, the legislative lift would likely not be as formidable as might be 
thought.  Presumably, the Speaker would have little problem assembling a 
majority in the House since he would have commanded a majority in the body 
immediately before the crisis.  The Cabinet and the House acting together in 
a crisis atmosphere would likely be able to persuade the Senate, especially 
with a venerable member of the majority party of the upper chamber—the 
PPT—assisting in the advocacy. 
Moreover, Congress would need to legislate anyway to provide a clear and 
reliable method for the President and Vice President to regain office.234  
 
 230. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 231. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 8; see also supra Part V.A. 
 232. See supra Parts III.B–C. 
 233. Associated Press, Obama Retakes Oath of Office After Flub, NBC NEWS (July 22, 
2009, 12:54 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28780417/ns/politics-white_house/t/obama-
retakes-oath-office-after-flub/#.WUbBRGjyvIU [https://perma.cc/SB72-YRVJ]. 
 234. It will be remembered that this Article proposes that, in their joint public 
announcement, the Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet provide an ad hoc path for the 
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Indeed, it would be in the interests of lawmakers supporting the President and 
Vice President’s return to establish such a statutory process.  Legislative 
language ratifying the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet’s actions would be part of 
this vital legislation. 
From a public advocacy standpoint, the Speaker, PPT, and the Cabinet 
would likely hold the upper hand over Congress.  They could rightly point 
out the reality that someone needs to temporarily lead the executive branch 
and no one else is in a position to do so.  The group might also emphasize 
that the 1947 presidential succession statute makes the Speaker the Acting 
President if there is dual incapacity235 and that there is currently a dual 
incapacity.  Arguably, Congress has already implicitly delegated this 
authority to the Speaker; now the Speaker-turned-Acting President—in 
conjunction with the PPT and the Cabinet—wishes to make the process 
explicit. 
In addition, it is uncertain who the rival claimants would be for 
congressional opponents to rally behind.  Indeed, those with a potential 
interest in the presidency—the PPT and Cabinet members—are central to the 
decision-making process and would be supporting the Speaker’s position.  
The PPT would need to agree in order for the decision to go forward, and it 
is difficult to imagine a Cabinet majority forming in favor of the Speaker if 
the Secretary of State—as the next in line of Cabinet succession—did not 
concur in judgment. 
Furthermore, it would be difficult for Congress to oppose the Speaker-
turned-Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet to essentially take the position 
that there should be no one to carry out the presidential duties and that there 
should remain an uncertain means by which the President and Vice President 
could regain office. 
It seems hard to imagine that the Speaker, PPT, and Cabinet would move 
forward to temporarily replace the President and Vice President unless their 
dual incapacity were truly manifest.  Members of Congress would not be 
blind to the exigency surrounding their actions and would feel tremendous 
public pressure to resolve the crisis by supporting the Speaker, PPT, and 
Cabinet’s decision.236 
 
President and Vice President to use to return to office until Congress takes action.  If the 
President and Vice President wish to contest their inability and Congress had not yet provided 
a process for them to regain their offices, the President and Vice President could simply declare 
that they have regained capacity.  If the Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet contest their 
declaration, the matter should be sent to Congress with the understanding that Congress would 
decide, with any legislative inaction favoring the displaced officeholders.  Again, this would 
follow Twenty-Fifth Amendment norms.  As with Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
the presumption favors the President and Vice President returning to office, but would subject 
their declarations to some checks and balances.  This proposed process would be on much 
firmer ground, however, if it were provided by statute under authority of the Dual Inability 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses.   
 235. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012).  
 236. A recent example of Congress responding to exigent circumstances involved the 
response to the financial crisis in the fall of 2008.  Just weeks prior to the election, Congress 
took action to try to avert a potential economic freefall even though the solution—temporarily 
“bailing out” financial institutions—was wildly unpopular. See David M. Herszenhorn, 
2017] SOLVING DUAL INABILITY 1071 
If, however, for whatever reason, Congress ultimately did not ratify the 
group’s joint decision and provided no method by which the President and 
Vice President could return to office, the Speaker would simply remain as 
Acting President until either the President or Vice President recovered.  The 
Acting President’s public posture would remain that he, the PPT, and the 
Cabinet acted lawfully and that they had only requested Congress to legislate 
out of an abundance of caution. 
Indeed, if Congress did not ratify the group’s procedure and incapacity 
decision, the Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet could use the failure to their 
advantage.  The group could assert that this failure to act reflects 
congressional acquiescence.  In this regard, they could claim this tacitly 
demonstrates legislative branch approval of their action.237  Of course, unlike 
with secret contingency plans, the group’s actions in this context in the “zone 
of twilight” would be public and done with the explicit knowledge of 
Congress and the public.  Moreover, congressional enactments, such as the 
appropriation bill funding White House operations, could be seen as 
providing implicit retroactive sanction to what the group had decided.238  
Furthermore, the longer the Acting President remains in office, the more 
legitimacy he likely stands to gain as the public’s anxiety begins to wane and 
the citizenry grows accustomed to him in the White House. 
D.  Potential Challenges from the Officeholders or Their Families 
Another potential counterargument is that a post hoc statute—retroactive 
by its very nature—might conceivably be challenged by the family or staff 
of the President or Vice President for violating the Bill of Attainder,239 Ex 
Post Facto,240 or Due Process Clauses.241 
Such constitutional challenges, assuming they clear prudential hurdles (no 
small task under the circumstances),242 would be dubious for several reasons.  
For one, Congress would be acting based on clear constitutional authority:  
the Dual Inability and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.  These Clauses exist 
alongside the Bill of Attainder, the Ex Post Facto, and the Due Process 
Clauses, and must be read in conjunction with them.243  When the 
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 237. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 238. In situations where the President is allegedly acting without express ex ante legislative 
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 240. See id. 
 241. See id. amend. V. 
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constitutional principle that executive power should never lapse is layered on 
top of this analysis, legal challenges based on the Bill of Attainder, Due 
Process, and Ex Post Facto Clauses would face serious hurdles. 
Furthermore, with dual incapacity, neither the President nor Vice President 
would suffer a real harm.  The Speaker, as proposed in this Article, would 
only become Acting President; he would not displace either officeholder.  
Thus, neither the President nor Vice President would lose their status, 
compensation, or benefits.  If the President or Vice President wanted to regain 
their capacity, they need only publicly declare it.  Congress would decide the 
matter if the Acting President, PPT, and Cabinet majority opposed the 
declaration, with inaction favoring the disabled officeholders. 
Finally, this lack of a tangible harm would be fatal to the Bill of Attainder 
and Ex Post Facto challenges, as the former requires a legislative 
punishment244 and the latter a criminal penalty to be retroactively 
enhanced.245  Neither a punishment nor a criminal penalty is involved with 
an incapacity determination.  Furthermore, Due Process Clause protections 
in a public employment context apply only to those holding statutorily 
created positions with civil-service protections; they do not extend to 
constitutional officers.246  Such considerations have nothing to do with 
deciding inability for the President and Vice President. 
CONCLUSION 
Dual incapacity is one of three major inability scenarios involving the Vice 
President that threatens the continuity of the executive branch.  The current 
state of the law in this area, unfortunately, leaves only imperfect options for 
policymakers.  Ideally, policymakers would take public action to resolve this 
matter proactively, in a manner that satisfies legality, legitimacy, and 
practicality concerns.  But since this has yet to happen, an examination of the 
different immediate choices is overdue. 
Were a dual incapacity situation to arise suddenly, to resolve this problem, 
the Speaker should consult with, and gain the blessing of, the PPT and a 
majority of the Cabinet.  The group should then jointly authorize executive 
branch attorneys to expeditiously craft a legal opinion.  With the legal 
opinion in hand, the Speaker, the PPT, and the Cabinet should declare that 
the Speaker is Acting President until either the President or Vice President 
regains capacity.  At the same time, the Speaker—as the new Acting 
President—the PPT, and the Cabinet should request that Congress ratify the 
process the group followed and the decision that they made.  They should 
also request legislation detailing how the President and Vice President could 
reclaim their offices.  While imperfect, the solution proposed in this Article 
does a better job of satisfying the three key criteria—legality, legitimacy, and 
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practicality—than competing approaches, and should be considered by 
policymakers “in a pinch.” 
